# Electoral Engineering for Partisan Gain?: Early Voting Sites, Same-Day Registration, and Young Americans*

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**Abstract**

Electoral reforms have been cast into the forefront of political discussions as states contemplate how best to provide access to voting while limiting the spread of CoVid-19. Adding fuel to the fire, these laws being heavily challenged on the grounds of creating partisan advantages or inducing fraud. While a wealth of scholarship has investigated whether enactment of certain electoral reforms advantage one party's supporters over another, less attention has been paid to how the administration of these reforms affect party supporters, and particularly to whether these administrative decisions may be intentional. Further, what electoral administration-focused research does exist mostly concentrates on state/county wide votes, racial and ethnic groups, or socioeconomic classes. To contribute to the literature and ongoing dialogue over electoral reforms, this study investigates 1) whether areas with more young people get more or less voting sites for early voting and same-day registration, and 2) if so, if there a partisan effort behind any differences. Young people often lack political resources and experience while tending to vote Democrat, suggesting they might be influenced by electoral reforms (particularly same-day registration) and their administration while also a potential target of partisan electoral engineering. Using a series of different model specifications and data covering presidential and midterm elections from 2012-2018, results indicate that counties with higher percentages of young people receive less voting sites for early voting, and this is especially true in states with same-day registration. Further analyses suggests elected and appointed official partisanship plays a role. Though both parties provide less sites to young voters, Republicans consistently provide less than Democrats.

## 1 Introduction

Access to voting has become a frequent topic of political discussion, as states alter their electoral laws in light of the 2020 Presidential Election and rising fears of a global pandemic. Proponents of liberalizing the voting process argue that making registration and voting easier will

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increase the turnout of marginalized groups who often abstain from voting, such as young, low-socioeconomic status, and minority citizens. Those who oppose easing barriers to participation claim that doing so invites rampant voter fraud, while making the process harder will protect against un-democratic actions but not have any disparate impacts on voting. Further, it would not be "America: 2020 Edition" if partisanship did not seep into the conversation. These electoral reforms have come under fire from pundits and politicians who claim that their enactment or administration benefits one party's supporters over another. The most frequent claim is that that liberalizing the registration and voting process will increase the turnout of likely Democratic voters because those who don't vote resemble those likely to vote Democrat while those who do vote more closely resemble Republicans (Hansford and Gomez (2010); Knack and White (1998)). Despite limited and mixed evidence supporting this assumption (Berinsky (2005); Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2017); Hansford and Gomez (2010); Herron and Smith (2014); Karp and Banducci (2001); Knack and White (1998); Franklin and Grier (1997); Neiheisel and Burden (2012); Stein and Garcia-Monet (1997)), law makers appear to be changing their electoral reforms in ways consistent with attempting to benefit from the assumed potential partisan consequences.

In Florida in 2011, the Republican controlled legislature voted to cut the number of early voting days in nearly half, while also removing the final Sunday as an early voting day. Shortly after this decision, members of the Florida Republican party openly admitted that "Republican Party [strategists and consultants] firmly believe that early voting is bad for Republican candidates. [Decreasing the number of early voting days] is done for one reason and one reason only… We've got to cut down on early voting because early voting is not good for us (Kam (2012))," while also remarking that concerns of voter fraud, the suggested reason for decreasing early voting days, was simply a "marketing ploy". Following record turnout for the 2020 Iowa Primary Election, in which the (Republican) Secretary of State sent out absentee registration forms to all registered Iowans, the Republican controlled legislature put forth a bill to prevent this from occurring in the 2020 General Election amidst adamant claims by the President of the United States that absentee voting

is fraught with fraud and benefits democratic supporters[1] .

Republicans are not the only one's altering election rules in line with the assumption that easing voting will help Democrats. In January of 2020, Democratic Illinois Governor, J.B. Pritzker signed a bill into law that allows students to miss class in order to vote without receiving any negative repercussions, such as lower attendance scores or missed assignments. In 2019, New York put forth a suite of election reforms, including early voting (championed by Democrat Zellnor Myrie), same-day registration (Indpendent Michael Gianaris), require the Board of Elections to transfer voter registration status whenever a New Yorker moves within-state (Democrat David Carlucci), youth pre-registration (also Democrat Carlucci) and a constitutional amendment to allow no-excuse absentee voting (Democrat Michael Gianaris) This is also happening at a national level. In 2019, House Democrats put forth an election reform bill with provisions to increase college voting, such as designating college campuses as voting and registration stations.

These attempts at partisan election engineering have frequently been documented in court cases, news articles, and social media. 28 states had new or pending litigation surrounding changes to their electoral laws in 2016, with many cases regarding attempts to restrict voting access that were sued on the grounds of disenfranchising likely Democratic supporters (Smith (2016)). An assumption with mixed support. While some find that easing the costs increases the voting of likely democrats, there are others that find Republicans taking advantage of permissive reforms, as well. Concerning same-day registration (SDR) and Election-Day registration (EDR), most evidence suggest that allowing voters to register and vote at the same time increases voter turnout (Burden et al. (2014); Hanmer (2009); Highton (1997); Highton and Wolfinger (1998); Knack and White (2000); Knack (2001); Leighley and Nagler (2013); Mitchell and Wlezien (1995); Neiheisel and Burden (2012); Rhine (1996); Springer (2012, 2014)). Further, claims of partisan effects are at least partially substantiated, with strong evidence suggesting that these reforms provide greater

[1]The full quote is "Democrats are trying to rig the 2020 Election, plain and simple!", which was a subtweet of an earlier tweet where President Trump wrote [sic], "The United States cannot have all Mail In Ballots. It will be the greatest Rigged Election in history. People grab them from mailboxes, print thousands of forgeries and "force" people to sign. Also, forge names. Some absentee OK, when necessary. Trying to use Covid for this Scam!" These tweets were sent out May 24, 2020 at 7:38 pm and 9:08 am, May 24, 2020 (https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1264717545787006976)

increases to voting for those assumed to favor democrats, like younger (Hanmer (2009); Leighley and Nagler (2013)), less educated ((Hanmer (2009, 2007); Leighley and Nagler (2013)), or poorer individuals (Leighley and Nagler (2013); Rigby and Springer (2011)). That is not to say there is no evidence for Republican advantages. Utilizing a natural experiment in Wisconsin of 1976, Neiheisel and Burden (2012) find that EDR decreased the actually democratic vote share. The authors argue this is because, "[t]hose most likely to take advantage of EDR are not randomly drawn from the pool of nonvoters; they tend to have higher levels of education and income, factors that also make them likely to vote Republican. Second, unlike the "motor voter" law, EDR does not create a preelection list of registrants from which Democratic campaigns might mobilize. This means that individual-level resources will continue to be important predictors of turnout (p.638)."

When it comes to early voting, Herron and Smith (2012) investigate which Floridians took advantage of this reform in the 2008 General Election. They find that this reform is taken advantage of by black, Hispanic, young, Democrat, and first-time voters. In 2014, the same authors analyze how the Sunshine State's 2011 move to cut the number of early voting sites affected voter turnout for the 2012 Florida General Election. They find that Florida's reduction of early voting days affected racial and ethnic minorities, Democrats, and independents, particularly due to the removal of Sunday as an early voting day. Yet, looking at Texas in 1994, Stein (1998) finds that early voters are older, male, poorer, more interested, stronger partisans, and conservative, findings with mixed support among other works(Gronke et al. (2008); Gronke and Toffey (2008); Jeffe and Jeffe (1990); Neeley and Richardson (2001)). Investigating early voting from a different angle, others find that it increases voting of those of higher income status (Kropf (2012); Rigby and Springer (2011)), not the turnout of the least well-off as the assumption contends, or may even decrease turnout (Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2017); Giammo and Brox (2010))

These studies demonstrate the potential partisan consequences that can come about by altering electoral reforms and their administration. However, two gaps within the existing literature need addressing. First, most evidence to date regarding partisan causes and consequences of electoral reforms relies on the same groups for analyses: usually state/county vote shares (e.g.Burden,

Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2017); Neiheisel and Burden (2012)) or the turnout of racial and ethnic minority groups (e.g.Fullmer (2015*b*); Herron and Smith (2014)) and those of varying socio-economic status (SES) (e.g.Kropf (2012); Rigby and Springer (2011)). Vote shares can determine how these reforms affect a party's overall electoral support but cannot tell which supporters within a party are affected, masking important variation in the effects of electoral reforms across groups. Related, using racial, ethnic, and SES groups as proxies for likely Democratic supporters has provided a wealth of knowledge to the literature, but there are other important political groups that are affected by electoral reforms and tend to vote for one party consistently, such as today's young Americans.

Today's youths (defined as those 18-35)[2], form a unique political group due to their size and diversity, unique life situation, recent patterns of participation, and their strong support for Democratic candidates and liberal policies. Young Americans belong to the largest and most racially/ethnically diverse cohort to date(Fry (2018)). They also have the highest levels of education (Fry (2018)) but are experiencing worse economic success than their parents (Bialik and Fry (2019); Fry (2017)). Young Americans started out as a group thought to be anti-political due to low voting rates and resources (Putnam (2000)), but recent elections have seen the youth vote increase as political parties and candidates focus more on youth turnout and they take advantage of permissive reforms. With their increased participation has also come increased support for Democratic candidates, as youths vote blue 2:1 and a near-super majority of young Americans identify as Democrats or leaning Democrat (Maniam and Smith (2017)). Just based on their susceptibility to changes in electoral costs and their affinity for the democratic party, young voters act as a uniquely positioned group to determine whether electoral reforms and their administration have partisan effects. However, few studies take consider the role of election reforms in youth participation. For

[2]For this study, young Americans are considered to be those adult individuals that belong to the Millennial or Generation Z generations (i.e. born after 1980 but 18+).I choose this cut off to compliment the political habituation and life-cycle literature (Converse and Niemi (1971); Dalton (2015); Gerber, Green and Shachar (2003); Highton and Wolfinger (2001); Nie, Verba and Kim (1974); Pacheco and Plutzer (2008); Plutzer (2002); Squire, Wolfinger and Glass (1987)), to reflect the stark demographic and political differences in earlier versus later generations that make young individuals today uniquely positioned for the study of partisan electoral engineering (Bialik and Fry (2019); Maniam and Smith (2017); Parker, Graf and Igielnik (2019)), and because the Census data gives discrete categories of age (18-24, 25-34, 35-45, etc).

example, the Herron and Smith (2014) article did not report results regarding whether cutting early voting days in Florida hurt youth turnout, though their previous (Herron and Smith (2012)) study showed that youths are more likely to take advantage of early voting. Matt Barreto and colleagues work on who possess valid forms of voter identification uncovered a tendency of young individuals to not have proper IDs (Barreto, Nuno and Sanchez (2009); Barreto et al. (2019), yet works on the effects of voter IDs tend to ignore young voters (but see Rogowski and Cohen (2012)).

The second, issue with the literature is that there is a tendency to focus on *state* level *enactment* (e.g. Fitzgerald (2005); Juelich and Coll (2020); Springer (2012, 2014)).[3] Though it is usually up to the state legislators to decide to enact a new reform, other officials have a large say in how they are administered across the state. A state legislature can pass election reforms to allow early voting but leave the discretion of where to put polling stations, and their hours and days of operation up to elected or appointed election officials, such as state Secretary of States or county level officials (*National Conference of State Legislators* (2020)). Related, and the third issue, is that the literature acknowledges partisan attempts at election engineering but usually does not test to see if election administration was altered by elected or election officials based on partisanship. Election officials in that same state that allowed early voting can also distribute the voting sites so that opposition supporters just happen to have less sites. Election-Day registration can be enacted, but if only co-partisan areas have enough poll workers and forms to handle the increased participation then effects could be unequal. By changing the number of poll stations, workers, hours, etc., public officials can alter the resources it costs to vote, and potentially voter turnout of different groups due to uneven resource distribution (Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995); Verba et al. (1993); Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995)).

In fact, claims of election engineering were at the heart of a lawsuit on behalf of Stacey Abrams, who ran for Governor of Georgia on the Democratic ticket but lost to then-Secretary of State Republican Brian Kemp by 55,000 votes. A civil rights group sued Kemp on Abrams behalf, claiming

[3]While there are numerous studies that investigate how within or across state variation in administration affects voter turnout (e.g. Burden, Canon, Mayer, Moynihan and Neiheisel (2017); Herron and Smith (2014); Neiheisel and Burden (2012); Stein and Vonnahme (2012*a*); Walker, Herron and Smith (2019)), most investigations are limited to a single or handful of states (or one county Brady and McNulty (2011)) and do not focus on young individuals.

that the Secretary of State used his powers as a chief elections officer to suppress minority turnout. In doing so, now-Governor Kemp may have made the costs of voting easier to some and not others based on their potential partisan support.[4] Focusing on whether a state adopts a law and its effects ignores the considerable variation in how the law is administered on a sub-state level, which could affect the effectiveness of the law within states (Fullmer (2015*a*)). Additionally, focusing on partisan administration effects on young voters is advantageous in that, as mentioned earlier, young voters are influenced by changing costs to vote and overwhelmingly support Democrats. As such, they are a potentially lucrative target for both parties, with Republicans wanting less youth turnout and Democrats desiring more.

To determine if electoral administration differs by age group and if this is the result of partisan engineering, this study proceeds in two steps. First, I use county level data from the Election Assistance Council's Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS, 2012-2018), merged with county-level demographic information from the U.S. Census' American Community Survey (ACS, 2012-2018) to test whether counties with more young people receive different amounts of early voting. Multilevel ordinary least squares results show that counties comprised of more young individuals received fewer voting sites, regardless of whether the state has also implemented same-day registration. Second, I include a covariate for the party identification of the chief elections officer, which is usually the state Secretary of State. I find that both parties provide fewer sites to young voters, but Republicans consistently provide fewer sites and show greater disparity between populations with more or less young people. These results are important for both scholarly and policy reasons, as well as its contribution to the ongoing public and political debate regarding partisan consequences of electoral reforms.

The remainder of this paper is as follows. Next, I discuss who young voters are, why they are an important demographic in American politics, and why they provide a good case study for po-

[4]Kemp is not the only Secretary of State to come under fire on accusations of partisan election engineering. In the 2004 Presidential Election, Ohio (R) Secretary of State refused to accept voter registration forms that were printed on paper thinner than prescribed by law. 4 years later, the newly elected Ohio (D) Secretary of State did not accept absentee ballot requests that did not check a box asking if they were registered to vote, despite not being required by law. For more instances of potential partisan election engineering, see Hasen (2012).

tential partisan election engineering. This then leads into a discussion of the theory regarding how electoral laws and their administration affect voter turnout, and the wide latitude afforded to state and county level officials in the administration of elections. This segues into a discussion of how and why I expect electoral reforms and partisan administration to affect youth voting, complete with hypotheses. Following this, I investigate whether the number of voting sites per 1,000 people are influenced by the presence of young individuals, whether this differs in (non)same-day registration states, and what impacts Republican election official partisanship has on these relationships. I then consider alternative explanations for the findings. And finally, I close with a summary of the findings and suggestions for future work.

# 2 Who Are Young Americans?

Today's youths are unique when compared to their older counterparts today and compared to older individuals when they were young. This uniqueness derives from several factors, including their size, diversity, education, (lack of) economic success, and political preferences/ participation. First, they are the largest generation, at over 75 million Millennials.[5] Related, the newer generations are substantially more racially and ethnically diverse. Only 56% of Millennials are white, compared to 62% of Generation X, 75% of Boomers, and 84% of the silent generation. Millennials also have the highest number of Hispanics (21%), Asian (7%), and other races (3%); and are tied with the proportion of blacks with Generation X (13%). Generation Z is following in the same direction, with greater racial and ethnic diversity (Fry (2018)).

Younger individuals also tend to be considerably more educated than their parents' and grandparents' generations, making them the most educated generation in American history. 39% of Millennials have a bachelor's degree or greater, 10% more than their predecessor, Gen X. Much of this growth is attributed to the rise of women in higher education. In 1989, 48% of 25-27-year olds who possessed a bachelor's degree were women. 20 years later, that number has jumped to 54%

[5]As a reminder, young people are defined as those 18-34. This encompasses almost the entire Millennial generation (22-34), as well as all of the voting-eligible Generation Z generation (18-22). For this reason, I compared the Millennial and Generation Z generations to older generations when discussing what makes today's young individuals unique compared to their older counterparts. Young/Millennial may be used interchangeably. Refer to Footnote 2.

due to more women entering higher education. Further, the percent of young people who have a high school degree or less has decreased from 73% in 1968, to 53% in 1989, to just 33% in 2018 (Bialik and Fry (2019)).

Though younger Americans have greater education levels, they have not seen equivalent economic success. The 2008 financial crisis took a toll on many Millennials, the youngest of which were just starting to enter the workforce while the oldest were entering college. Even now, the current economic recession is hitting when the youngest Millennials are exiting college and graduate school and trying to start their careers while the oldest of Generation Z are finishing their undergraduate education. Speaking of finishing education, sky rocketing costs of college tuition have been outpacing increases in college-assistance programs, causing those seeking a higher education to take on a larger financial burden through increased student debt with higher interest rates, leading to one in three young people being burdened with student debt, compared to roughly one in seven adults nationwide (Cilluffo (2019)).

This economic turmoil, coupled with increased financial burden of student debt, has set the Millennial generation to be the first generation expected to earn less than their parents. Further, it has delayed many of the life-events scholars suggest increase voter participation (Nie, Verba and Kim (1974); Squire, Wolfinger and Glass (1987); Highton and Wolfinger (2001)). Less than 40% of Millennials own houses, compared to 47% of Gen X, with Millennials of color taking a larger hit to homeownership. To make up for the loss of housing, Millennials are more likely to rent or live with their parents. They are also the first U.S. generation to have less than 50% of 23-38-year olds married at 44%. Related, they are less likely to have given birth than their parents at similar ages, with 55% of Millennial women having given birth, compared to 62% and 64% of Gen X and Boomers, respectively (Barroso, Parker and Bennet (2020); Bialik and Fry (2019); Fry (2017)).

Younger individuals today are also more likely to identify as Democrats, prefer progressive and liberal policies, and support Democratic candidates. 59% of Millennials lean or identify as Democrats, compared to 43-48% of previous generations (Maniam and Smith (2017)). As for policies, nearly two-thirds of Millennials think government should do more to solve problems,

while three out of five say that increasing racial and ethnic diversity is good for society, and 62% approve of football players kneeling to protest. 62% of Millennials said they supported the Democrat that was running for their Congressional District office in 2016, and those ages 18-29 made up 66% of the Democratic vote share in 2008 (which would have been mostly Millennials), supporting then first-time Presidential Candidate Barack Obama (Parker, Graf and Igielnik (2019); Rosentiel (2008)). The closest older generation, Gen X, is 8-16% less likely to answer the same for these questions, with all older generations being even less likely. Those younger than Millennials, Generation Z, are similar to, if not more liberal than, Millennials (Parker, Graf and Igielnik (2019)).

Last, young individuals have a unique pattern of participation. Today's youths were originally cast as non- or even anti-political due to their low voter participation (Putnam (2000)) or lack of political tendencies(Wolfinger and Hoffman (2001)). However, this early research ignored all the non-traditional ways in which young people, disillusioned by the contemporary politics during their upbringing, were making their voices heard. Though originally less likely to vote, young people are more likely to volunteer for campaigns, be politically active on social media, attend rallies, post signs, and more (Dalton (2008, 2015)). Further, over the course of the most recent handful of elections, youth voting has dramatically increased. In 2016, one in four ballots were cast by someone under 35 years of age. 2018 saw a large increase in the turnout of young Americans, with Millennials nearly doubling their turnout rate from 2014 (Bureau (2019)). This marked the biggest increase in voting for any group (including race, ethnicity gender, education, etc.). Because of recent increases in voting participation, the large size of the youngest cohorts, and their strong liberal bend, a group that was previously marred as inconsequential to politics has begun to move to the forefront of the party mobilization tactics. Taken together, these factors demonstrate the unique group that today's youths are, as well as the influential position they may hold in politics should they choose to participate (or be prevented from doing so). As such, political parties have electoral incentives to alter electoral rules to increase or decrease youth participation.

# 3 Participation, Electoral Reforms and (Partisan?) Administration: The Role of Resources, Reforms, and Election Officials

To understand the relevance of electoral reforms and their administration to participation, consider the calculus of voting theorem developed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), an extension of Downs et al. (1957). The authors argue that voters weigh the costs and benefits of voting, and vote when the benefits outweigh the costs. As scholars of election behavior, and anyone who has ever cast a ballot before knows, participation incurs costs. Individuals have to pay these costs by giving up their (sometimes) free time, (hopefully) disposable income, and using their (maybe acquired) civic skills. Potential voters must take time to get registered and vote. This may involve long lines at the DMV or polling station, time spent traveling there, and more. Disposable income is relevant to voting as individuals may have to take time off work to register or vote.[6] They may also have to hire a babysitter, pay for gas or public transportation, or purchase a valid ID.[7] All of this assumes that one actually possesses the relevant civic skills to know how, where, and when to register and vote; the electoral regulations in their area, the ability to read and understand the predominantly English ballots on Secretary of State websites, and more.

These resources have been directly linked to voter turnout, with those who have more voting more often (Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995); Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995); Verba et al. (1993); Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980)). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), in their Book *Who Votes*, demonstrate the large role that education plays in voting. The authors remark that the increased civic skills, social pressures, and greater parental affluence that accompanies increased education often make it easier and motivate citizens to vote. Additionally, the authors also note that income can increase turnout and may be more influential on those with lower education. A decade

[6]Though many states protect a person's right to vote without losing pay, there is no federal law. Further, no state gives time off for individuals to register to vote.

[7]Some states provide voter identification forms to voters, however; whether this happens and continued access to them differs. Iowa, which just recently enacted voter ID requirements, will mail voter ID cards to registered voters for free upon request. South Carolina, the first state to enforce voter ID requirements, also give eligible voters a free ID card but they will have to go to the DMV and wait in line to get it.

later, Verba and colleagues added free time and civic voluntarism to the equation and demonstrate the powerful impacts of these resources by showing that once these factors are controlled for, there are no significant differences in by racial and ethnic groups (Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995); Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995); Verba et al. (1993)). Since then, a plethora of literature has found these and other resources to be influential in voting (Pacheco and Plutzer (2008); Pacheco and Fletcher (2015); Plutzer (2002))

It is precisely because of these costs and resources that electoral reforms work. Electoral reforms exploit the need for resources to participate by adjusting the costs of voting up or down, leading to needing more or less resources to vote. When permissive reforms are enacted, costs go down so less resources are needed to participate. For example, registration represents a significant hurdle to voting. As mentioned earlier, registration can take considerable time. Further, individuals must meet residency requirements (e.g. be a resident of that specific town or county for 30 days), know when their registration deadline ends, and have any documents that might be needed to register. Same day and election day registration essentially eliminate many of these costs by allowing individuals to vote and register on the same day and potentially on a day of their convenience, increasing voter turnout (Burden et al. (2014); Fitzgerald (2005); Hanmer (2009); Highton (1997); Highton and Wolfinger (1998); Knack and White (2000); Knack (2001); Leighley and Nagler (2013); Mitchell and Wlezien (1995); Neiheisel and Burden (2012); Rhine (1996); Springer (2012, 2014)). When restrictive reforms are enacted (or permissive reforms get less permissive), costs go up and participation declines. Requiring voter IDs can lead to increased costs, as voters have to possess the proper identification or acquire it (potentially costing time, money, and civic skills). This can lead to less people voting because they cannot afford the costs of getting an ID.[8]

Administration is relevant to electoral reforms because how the reform is administered can af-

[8]Evidence on the effects of voter identification requirements is mixed. Some authors find that they negatively impact all voters (Alvarez, Bailey and Katz (2008)), while others argue the impact is mostly felt by minorities (Barreto, Nuno and Sanchez (2009); Barreto et al. (2019); Hajnal, Lajevardi and Nielson (2017); Hajnal, Kuk and Lajevardi (2018)), and still some that say there is only a slight or no negative impact (Erikson and Minnite (2009); Grimmer et al. (2018); Highton (2017); Mycoff, Wagner and Wilson (2007); Rocha and Matsubayashi (2014)). Last, other research has pointed out the potential impact of local poll-worker discretion and administration (Atkeson et al. (2010, 2014)).

fect how much it makes voting easier or harder. Two states may both enact same-day registration, but if one state allows anyone to register and vote for 40 days and the other only allows the same actions for 10 days, there could be significant differences in the effectiveness of same-day registration between those states. Similarity, reducing the number of early voting sites might decrease voting, as individuals must now incur greater costs due to longer lines formed by less stations and days. The costs of poor election administration has been well documented, with researchers showing that the number of polling places available, the length of lines, number of workers, days available, quality of election lists, technology used, and more affect voter turnout and satisfaction (Brady and McNulty (2011); Burden and Stewart III (2014); Burden, Canon, Mayer, Moynihan and Neiheisel (2017); Dyck and Gimpel (2005); Fullmer (2015*a*,*b*); Herron and Smith (2014); Stein et al. (2008); Stein and Vonnahme (2012*b*,*a*); Stewart III and Ansolabehere (2015)).

These decisions- whether to adopt certain laws, extend early voting, decrease the number of polling sites -are mostly made by elected or appointed public officials,[9] individuals who likely have partisan affiliations that may alter their desire to enact a reform or change how it is administered. Further, besides legislators writing the law, many other elected or appointed officials may be involved in the administration of the reform. For example, in most states, the Secretary of State[10] represent the state's chief election officer. They are responsible for the administration of elections, including following, implementing, and enforcing voting rules and regulations. In many states, they are tasked with ensuring state elections abide by federal guidelines, but they also may prepare ballots, are responsible for maintaining voter registration databases, and other election administration related activities. These individuals hold considerable power over how to conduct an election and, as has been frequently accused, may use that power for partisan gain.

Evidence for electoral reform enactment and administration correlating with public official

[9]Over half of U.S. states elect county clerks as a county-wide office. Thirty-five states also elect their Secretary of State, twelve are appointed by the Governor, and three are selected by the state legislature.

[10]Though the title varies by state (e.g. Secretary of the Common wealth in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, Lieutenant Governor in many other states), as do their specific responsibilities (such as being in charge of cable television franchises in South Carolina), the most common and important responsibility of individuals in this position is their administration of elections.

partisanship has been growing in recent years[11], especially thanks to the application of policy diffusion theory and event history analysis to the electoral law literature. Repeated studies have found that Republicans are more likely to sign voter ID reforms into law (Hicks et al. (2015); Rocha and Matsubayashi (2014)), especially as the size of minority populations increase (Biggers and Hanmer (2017); Hicks, McKee and Smith (2016*b*)). Looking at a more permissive reform, Hicks, McKee and Smith (2016*a*) investigate who voted to enact online voter registration (OVR). Though state legislators from both parties were likely to vote yes, Democrats were 20% more likely. Further, qualitative evidence of partisanship influencing enactment, administration, and perceptions of electoral laws are plentiful, from the Florida law makers openly admitting that cutting early voting days was done to affect voters (Kam (2012)), to claims of Republicans purposefully targeting young voters (Chang (2020); Levine (2019); McLean (2020); Wines (2019)), and more (see Hasen (2012)).

# 4 Youths, Electoral Reforms, and Administration

What does this have to do with young people? I have so far argued that young people are susceptible to changes in the costs to vote and have recently began throwing their larger electoral weight around, particularly in support of Democratic candidates. Their easily altered voting behavior, coupled with their single-party preference and increasing political influence makes young people a potentially target for partisan election engineering; with Democrats attempting to increase the youth vote while Republicans may try to stifle it. Is there any evidence that young people are affected by electoral reforms and are political parties reacting consistently?

First, evidence regarding whether young people take advantage of electoral laws more than older people is dependent on what law is under review. Herron and Smith (2012) find that young Floridians are more likely to take advantage of early voting. However, Stein (1998) looks at ealry voting in Texas and finds that older individuals tend to take advantage of early voting more than

[11]This is not to say all election engineering or enactment is partisan. Some laws are enacted at least partially on the basis that it may help voters. When looking at the enactment of no-excuse absentee voting and early voting, Biggers and Hanmer (2015) find that states that were larger or with older populations are more likely to enact early voting, while partisanship played only a small role.

younger individuals, that they are better educated, and politically active. This is supported at the national level by Gronke and Toffey (2008). There is greater evidence for youths taking advantage of reforms that allow individuals to vote and register at the same time. Simply on the basis that younger people are more likely to be unregistered suggests they may be able to take advantage of SDR. Supporting this assumption, multiple scholars have found that allowing individuals to register and vote at the same time can greatly increase the turnout of young voters. Hanmer (2009) finds that the enactment of Election-Day registration benefited young voters with an increase in voting anywhere from 3.2-6.0 percentage points, 1-2 percentage points greater than older voters. These findings are supported by Leighley and Nagler (2013), who also find that EDR provided a sizeable bump to older voter turnout.

Are political parties reacting in ways consistent with the evidence that young people may vote more if costs are reduced? Republicans in Iowa unsuccessfully moved to effectively eliminate voting on college campus in 2019 after several elections of college voting sites voting blue and following the aftermath of a midterm election where incumbent Governor Republican Kim Reynolds won reelection by a bare 2.8% over her Democratic challenger. Iowa is not alone. in 2019, the Republican legislature in Texas banned "mobile" election sites, such as those on college campuses and churches. In 2018, New Hampshire sparked controversy when Republican Governor Sununu signed HB 1264 into law, which forced transient populations (such as college students) to pay licensing and registration fees if they drove in Ohio and wanted to vote. Besides the money spent on those fees, the law reportedly left many college students confused as to whether or not they were legally allowed to vote. As a final example, consider Florida's Senate Bill 7066, signed into law July of 2019. Though touted by some as a step forward in voting rights by restoring the right to vote for felons who paid any outstanding fines and debts[12], this bill also edited where early voting sites would be allowed by adding language requiring that voting places "must provide sufficient nonpermitted parking to accommodate the anticipated amount of voters." This effectively renders many college campuses as non-viable voting centers due to (as many college students can tell you)

[12]This requirement was struck down by U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle, citing the need to pay fines and debts before voting as tantamount to a poll tax. However, Judge Hinkle rejected accusations that the law was discriminatory.

very limited parking.

While Republicans seem to actively be working to hinder the youth vote, Democrats are moving in the opposite direction. For the 2020 primary election, the Nevada Democratic party moved to designate over 80 new early voting sites for caucus goers, including creating sites at Truckee Meadows Community College, the College of Southern Nevada (at the Las Vegas, Charleston, and Henderson campuses), and the University of Nevada (at the Reno and Las Vegas campuses). As a result, Nevada saw an increase of over 20,000 votes when compared to 2016, and nearly 70% of all votes cast were cast early. In 2019, California moved to expand the definition of what constituted a "public building" to purposefully include college campuses, as well as require that election officials consider college and university campuses as potential early voting centers. This bill passed 65-11-3, with all "Noes" coming from Republicans. Once again, it appears that electoral parties are operating in ways consistent with the assumption that easing voting increases likely democrats, in this case young people, while making it harder may decrease their turnout.

Consideration of the lack of participatory resources among young voters, their susceptibility to changes in electoral costs, their increasing influence in American politics, and their affinity for liberal parties and policies, coupled with the quantitative and qualitative evidence that Republicans have been actively working to reduce access to voting, especially as it pertains to young voters and college campus voting sites, the following hypothesis are suggested:

**Hypothesis 1.** *The Site Gap- Areas with larger youth populations will have fewer voting sites.*

**Hypothesis 2.** *The Partisan Site Gap- Areas with larger youth populations and that are governed by Republican election officials will have fewer voting sites than areas with similar sized youth populations and that are governed by Democrats.*

# 5 Data and Methods

To test whether young voters receive less voting sites, if this is because of partisan election engineering, and whether this ultimately affects youth voting, this study proceeds in two steps, focusing on the number of early voting sites per 1,000 people in a county. First, I use county level data from

the Election Assistance Council's Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS, 2012-2018), with county-level demographic information from the U.S. Census' American Community Survey (ACS, 2012-2018) to test whether counties with more young people receive different amounts of early voting sites. Second, using the same data but including covariates for election official partisanship, I examine whether the disparities in voting site distribution differ by the presence of Republican or Democratic officials.

The dependent variable is provided by the EAVS, the number of early voting sites per 1,000 people (Fullmer (2015*b*)). The EAVS is conducted by the Election Assistance Council with the purpose of surveying county and local election officials over their administration of elections. The EAVS are unique in that they are the only survey that conducts a near-population survey of counties regarding their election administration. Each survey wave gathers data from 2,990-3,010 counties, just shy of the 3,100 or so counties in the United States.[13] Though the EAVS does sample a large number of areas, the completeness of the data is not always as to be desired. For example, though a vast majority of counties in states that offer early voting report at least one site, some do not. While this could be because they simply have none, state guidelines suggest they should have at least one. To retain cases, those counties that report zero early voting sites are coded as having one.[14] When all is said and done, this survey uses 7,080 counties, 2,300-2,400 per year.

As for the explanatory variable, I rely on data from the ACS (2012-2018)[15] to measure the percent of the population between the ages of 18 and 34.[16] The ACS also provide several controls. Previous research has shown that states with older populations are more likely to adopt early voting and areas with older populations have more early voting sites (Biggers and Hanmer (2015); Fullmer (2015*b*)). Because of this, I control for the percent of the county over 65 and older. Racial and

[13]The EAVS also collected data from towns and other local areas. These areas were aggregated to county.

[14]Findings are robust to leaving the value at zero (though impossible values occur, as models predict having negative number of polling places per 1,000 due to their county having zero), including a binary indicator for whether the county had its number of sites altered, dropping those sites, and using logged versions of each due to linearity issues. Available at request.

[15]I use the five-year averages for the ACS for increased accuracy and area coverage. One-year estimates only cover the largest counties.

[16]See Footnote 2.

ethnic populations may also influence how many sites individuals have to register and/or vote at (Fullmer (2015*b*)), so I include the percent of the population that is black and that is Hispanic. Areas with greater population may need more voting sites to handle the larger size of the local electorate, so measures of total population and population density are included. I also include other important demographic information: the percent of the county population with a high school degree or greater, their median income, and poverty rate. Last, to make sure the results I am finding are not just differences in state abilities to conduct elections, I include the Elections Performance Index (Stewart (2020)) as an additional control variable.[17]

Last, I employ multilevel liner regression with counties nested in states and year fixed effects. Multilevel regression is employed to help account for the violation of independent observations caused by measuring the difference in electoral administration across observations nested in units that define the parameters for all observations within that unit. In other words, though there is within state variation in the number of voting sites designated by election officials, areas can only have a certain range of voting sites as prescribed by law and do-able with available election resources (e.g. state funding). This inherent specifying of the scope possible values of the dependent variable based on the super-unit that the unit of analysis is clustered within biases standard errors and may lead to false inferences. Multilevel regression accounts for this inter-group correlation by modeling the parameters of the equation as a function of the super-units parameters (Snijders and Bosker (2011); Steenbergen and Jones (2002); see also Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009)). Year fixed effects are included to account for temporal effects. With all that being said, results are robust to ordinary least squares and the in/exclusion of year fixed effects.[18] Results shown based on multilevel linear regression with year fixed effects.

[17]How well a state conducts their elections may also be related to how many polling stations they employ. To ensure the validity of the results, I also estimate models without the Elections Performance Index. Results are robust to its inclusion or exclusion and available at request.

[18]See Supplemental Appendix C.

# 6 The Age Site Gap

I first test whether counties with more young people receive fewer sites, with evidence suggesting this to be true. Turning to model 1 in Table 1, the coefficient for the percentage of the population 18-34 is negative and statistically significant (-0.0129, p=0.000). A one unit (one percent) increase in the percent of the population that is between the ages of 18-34 decreases the density of early voting sites by 0.0129. In other words, a county with 10% young people would have roughly one fewer early voting site per 1,000 people than a county with nearly all youths, such as college towns, as suggested by Figure 1. While one voting site per 1,000 people may not seem like a lot, one site can make a large difference in densely populated areas. One additional site may not do much to help the citizens of Loving County Texas, with a population of about 700, but could be a great asset to Los Angeles County, with its ten million residents of which nearly a quarter are between the ages of 18-34.

%

[Insert Table 1 here]

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Further, not all early voting states are the same. Instead, some may also employ same-day registration (SDR) alongside early voting, allowing eligible voters to register and vote head of election day. California, Hawaii, Montana, and Utah, just to name a couple states, allow voters to double dip in early voting and same-day registration reforms, while states like Florida, Indiana, New Jersey, and West Virginia do not.[19] Does the added convenience of same-day registration alter the number of election sites a state gets? As suggested by the coefficient for same-day registration in model 1 Table 1, the answer is yes. States that employ early voting and same-day registration receive 0.35 less sites per 1,000 people than do those without. Does the presence of SDR affect the relationship between youth population size and the number of early voting sites? Model 2 in

[19]This is referring specifically to same-day registration, not including Election Day registration.

Table 1 interacts SDR with the size of the county youth population, with a statistically significant result. Figure 2 illustrates the differences in the density of early voting sites based on county youth population between SDR and non-SDR states. SDR and non-SDR states employ nearly the same number of sites in low-youth areas, but SDR states have 0.41 sites less in high-youth areas.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

# 7 The Partisan Age Site Gap

So far, results suggest that young people are at somewhat of a disadvantage when it comes to voting access, as areas with larger youth populations tend to see less early voting, and this may be especially the case with same-day registration/voting sites. However, this does not necessarily mean partisan election engineering is to blame. For that, I include a covariate of whether the state Secretary of State (SoS)[20] is a Republican interacted with the percent of the population ages 18-34. Considering the large role that SoS's play in conducting elections, there are a myriad of ways they can influence elections (e.g. purging voter rolls, only accepting ballots on certain weighted paper, overseeing the uneven distributing polling places and equipment).

Looking at Table 2, there is evidence that the density of polling sites in young areas differ by political party. Model 1, which samples all states with early voting, displays a significant interaction for SoS partisanship and youth population. Figure 3 shows that both parties provide less sites to young voters, but that youths are disadvantaged at higher rates by Republicans. In areas with the lowest youth percentages, Republicans provide slightly less sites per 1,000 people, compared to

[20]It is also worth noting that evidence for public official partisanship influencing youth access to voting is further supported when I swap the covariate for Secretary of State with Governor, as indicated by Table B2 and Figure B2 in Supplemental Appendix B. Those results largely replicate the findings from using the Secretary of State, but not as substantively large. This similar, but less substantive, finding makes intuitive sense considering that, in many states, governors appoint the secretary of state, and in all states, the secretary of state resides in the executive branch, suggesting that governor's may influence who is administering elections and how they are administered through their appointment and persuasion powers (e.g. Neustadt (1991); Rogowski (2016)). Further, because secretary of states are still afforded discretion as to how to conduct elections, the finding that the governors position is less influential is consistent with bureaucratic discretion making and influence (e.g. Huber and Shipan (2002); Potter (2019)). Same-day registration states with Democrat Governors provide more voting sites to young people than do same-day registration states with Republican Governors. However, while Democrats decrease their site density as youth populations increase, Republicans seem unaffected, similar to the SoS results.

Democrats (1.22 vs 1.52, respectively). In areas with the most young people, Democrats provide nearly four times the number of sites (0.24 vs 0.85). From min-max percentage youth population, Democrats provide 0.67 less sites per 1,000 people to young voters: Republicans, 0.97, a neraly 50% reduction in voting access for young voters.

%

[Insert Table 2 here]

[Insert Figure 3 here]

To see if these partisan effects differ by whether the state also allows eligible individuals to register before voting, I sub-sample by whether the state employs same-day registration or not while continuing the interaction of Secretary of State partisanship and the percent youth per county. Models 2-3 in Table 2 display the results. First, model 2 finds that there are no partisan differences in non-same-day registration states. The coefficient for the interaction is statistically insignificant. However, in states that allow voters to register and vote before election day, an interesting result occurs. Displayed in Figure 4, Democrats still provide youth voters with more voting sites in absolute terms, however, they decrease the number of sites they provide as the youth population increases, while Republicans either don't change or may even have a small uptick. This is not completely in line with the hypotheses, but also isn't evidence against it. Democrats do still provide more sites to young voters than Republicans. However, Republicans in same-day registration states do not change the number of sites they designate based on age composition of the county.

[Insert Figure 4 here]

# 8 The Partisan Age Site Gap: Partisan Prejudice, Concerns of Fraud, Hanlon's Razor, or Simply Unintended Consequences?

This study argues that Republicans are less willing to provide early voting sites to areas with larger youth populations because doing so could increase youth turnout, potentially increasing the

Democratic share of the two-party vote due to youth's high support for liberal policies and Democratic candidates. In support of this, the evidence presented here suggests there are differences in the number of voting sites allotted to young voters based on whether the sites are administered under a Democratic or Republican controlled election administration. However, this does not necessarily mean that Republicans are working to actively (dis)advantage young voters more than Democrats. Instead, the results I find could come about through differences in voter fraud concern by party, non-partisan negligence, or because of other systemic biases that happen to also result in an anti-young bias. However, consideration of these alternative explanations suggests they may not be the culprit behind the biased voting site distribution.

Republicans have frequently sought to use the claim of voter fraud as justification for tightening the restrictions on voting, suggesting that making it harder to vote will deter/prevent those who wish to do so illegally from being able to. The reduction in sites may reflect differences in partisan concern regarding fraudulent voting. However, even though claiming voter fraud in defense of restricting access to voting does seem to be the Republican party line, numerous accounts from previous GOP strategists and members suggest their concern for fraud may be a front (e.g. Hasen (2012); Kam (2012)). This, coupled with the lack of evidence for large-scale fraudulent voter campaigns in both academic and government accounts (e.g PACEI (2018); Minnite (2011), suggests that concerns of voter fraud may not be behind the decreased voting sites for young people in Republican states. However, the fact that I find significant party differences in the full sample and same-day registration sub-sample but not same-day registration states may suggest that concerns of fraud may not completely be irrelevant.

As for negligence, the uneven distribution of voting sites could simply be an administrative overlook or accident. As suggested by the aphorism, Halon's razor, "never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." However, I think that this alternative explanation can be ruled out on the basis of many qualitative accounts of Republicans working to decrease voting access (e.g. Hasen (2012)) and the student vote in particular (Chang (2020); Levine (2019); McLean (2020); Wines (2019)). This is especially plausible when one considers those factors

that make youths an attractive target for partisan engineering (e.g. their size, participation rates, partisan preference, and susceptibility to changes in the costs of voting).

Last, it could be that, in an effort to affect another group's voter turnout, young people are also being affected. As mentioned earlier, some research has shown that other demographic groups receive less early voting sites (e.g. Fullmer (2015*b*)).[21] It could be that the disadvantages other groups receive are spilling over to affect younger voters. Yet, the inclusion of a series of demographic controls (e.g. race, ethnicity, education, income, other age groups) suggests this may not be the case.

# 9 Summary, Conclusion, and Future Directions

Claims that electoral reforms have partisan consequences are frequent. From memes shared on Facebook and tweets posted by the President, to statements made by litigators and news anchors, the assumption that easing voting helps democrats while restricting voting hurts them is considered common knowledge. Despite mixed evidence in support of this claim, political parties and strategists appear to be altering their electoral environments in consistent ways. This is especially obvious when it comes to altering youth access to voting, which have spawned headlines such as "Young People Aren't Apathetic. They're Facing Major Voting Obstacles (Chang (2020))" and "Republicans win in effort to limit 'liberal' student vote in key 2020 races (Levine (2019))".

The stories that accompany headlines such as these capture a side of electoral reforms that scholars have not often investigated: purposeful partisan electoral engineering through the administration of electoral reforms. There is evidence that shows potential partisan consequences of having a reform and its administration on party and likely-party supporters (Berinsky (2005); Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2017); Herron and Smith (2014); Kropf (2012); Neiheisel and Burden (2012); Rigby and Springer (2011)), as well as some evidence that partisanship influences the decision of whether to adopt a new reform or not (Biggers and Hanmer (2015, 2017); Hicks et al. (2015); Hicks, McKee and Smith (2016*a*,*b*); Rocha and Matsubayashi (2014)). However,

[21] Though, they did not test for partisan causes or implications.

evidence for the partisanship influencing the administration of the reform is less common (but see Hasen (2012) for an in-depth qualitative investigation into partisan election administration). To determine whether administration of elections is influenced by the partisanship of those conducting them, this study looks at the density of early voting sites in a county changes based on the size of its youth population and the partisanship of the state Secretary of State.

Young people represent a potentially fruitful target of partisan political engineering due to the political power that stems from their overwhelming size and recent increases in political participation (Cilluffo and Fry (2019)). Further, they are susceptible to changes in the costs to vote due to their lack of resources, with a growing body of evidence demonstrating the impact that electoral reforms have on young voters (Hanmer (2009); Holbein and Hillygus (2016); Juelich and Coll (2020); Leighley and Nagler (2013); Wolfinger, Highton and Mullin (2005)). Last, young people today demonstrate a strong preference for Democratic candidates and liberal/progressive policies (Maniam and Smith (2017); Parker, Graf and Igielnik (2019); Rosentiel (2008)). These factors, political size and influence, voter turnout that can be changed by altering the costs to vote, and their one-sided political preference makes them a potential target of partisan election engineering, as Democrats try to make it easier for youths to vote and Republicans do the opposite.

One way these changes to vote costs are engineered is through altering the administration of voting, such as adding more early voting days or taking away the number of voting places. Small tweaks to how elections are administered can have large consequences on voter turnout, satisfaction, and count accuracy (Brady and McNulty (2011); Burden, Canon, Mayer, Moynihan and Neiheisel (2017); Herron and Smith (2014); Stein et al. (2008); Stein and Vonnahme (2012*b*,*a*)). Further, this administration is often done, not through legislation, but state and local-level election officials. State Secretary of States are the chief elections officer, often presiding over voter registration rolls, state election funds, and federal compliance. As such, they have significant opportunity and ability to alter elections.[22] But do they and is it partisan?

For starters, I first documented the overall site gap based on age. I find that counties with larger

[22]For example, see Kemp and the 2018 Georgia Gubernatorial election, Blackwell and the 2004 Ohio Presidential Election, Brunner and the 2008 Ohio Presidential Election, and Hasen (2012).

youth shares of the population receive one less early voting site per 1,000 people than do areas with less youths. This could reflect a desire to provide easier access to voting to those who may be seen as needing it the most, such as the elderly. This could also reflect a strategic move on the parties' behalf to focus resources (e.g. voting sites) in areas where they could get the most bang for their buck. Since young people turnout less than older people, both parties may try to allocate more sites to older individuals. In addition to this finding, I uncover evidence that states with or without same-day registration provide roughly equal sites in areas with the fewest young people, but that states with same-day registration provide 0.35 fewer sites per 1,000 people to areas with more young people than those without same-day registration. This is findings is important considering previous findings have shown that same-day registration increases youth voting. It could be that the effects of this popular reform have not been reaching their full potential due to biased access to voting places for young individual.

Past identifying any systemic differences in access to voting based on age, I wanted to know whether partisan efforts accounted for part of this age site gap. Interacting whether the Secretary of State was a Republican with the youth population size in a county, I find that, in heavily youth populated counties, Republicans provide roughly one fewer site per 1,000 people than do Democrats. In areas with the least youths, Republicans provide slightly, if any, less than Democrats. When looking at differences in partisan administration between same-day registration (SDR) and non-SDR states, I find that Democrats provide more sites to young voters than do Republicans in SDR but there is no statistical difference in non-SDR states. This evidence that public official partisanship influences access to voting is further supported when interacting Governor partisanship with youth population size. The results are similar to, but smaller in scale, then when investigating the influence of Secretary of State, which makes sense given that the Secretary of State is responsible for the administration of elections as the chief elections officer, but is still housed in the executive branch and even appointed by the governor in some states.

The results of this study are both politically and academically important. This study contributes to ongoing political discourse by identifying ways in which electoral reforms can be manipulated

by political parties, potentially leading to partisan consequences. This is especially important considering recent and ongoing court battles over access to voting, some of which have centered on biased distribution of polling places, and rampant claims of partisan election engineering and outcomes. This study also contributes to the literatures on partisan election tactics, electoral reforms and administration, and youth voting. By documenting a difference in electoral administration based on an area's potential voter partisanship and election official's actual partisanship, this study uncovers evidence of public officials altering their election tactics to incorporate election administration. Second, it shows that election administration may differ based on local demographics, supporting and expanding upon previous works that have investigated similar topics (e.g. Dyck and Gimpel (2005); Fullmer (2015*b*,*a*)). Last, the youth literature has been expanded by the finding that access to voting may differ based on age, potentially influencing /partially accounting for differences in voter turnout across age groups and electoral reforms. Though this study has uncovered novel findings, more work should be done. Future works should extend upon the findings presented here to investigate more deeply the strategies the two parties use in determining where they allocate their sites (e.g. are Republicans less likely to allow on-campus voting) and determine whether these attempts have any actual effect on young voters (e.g. do young people vote less when there are less sites available?).

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Table (1) Predicting the number of voting sites per 1,000 people in a county

| | (1)<br>All Early Voting States<br>b/se | (2)<br>Youth X SDR<br>b/se |
|---|---|---|
| Same Day Registration | -0.350*** | |
| | (0.045) | |
| Same Day Registration | | -0.148 |
| | | (0.100) |
| Same Day Registration × Percent Age 18-34 | | -0.004** |
| | | (0.002) |
| Percent Age 18-34 | -0.013*** | -0.012*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Percent Age 65+ | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.003 | (0.003) |
| Population Density | -0.000 | -0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Percent Black | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Percent Hispanic | -0.000 | -0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Percent High School Grad | -0.002** | -0.002** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Median Income | -0.000* | -0.000* |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Poverty Rate | -0.002** | -0.002*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | 1.205*** | 1.156*** |
| | (0.162) | (0.163) |
| State Constant | -1.076*** | -1.081*** |
| | (0.120) | (0.120) |
| State Residual | -0.870*** | -0.871*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Observations | 7080 | 7080 |

Multilevel regression with counties nested in states. * 0.1 ** 0.05 ***0.01

Table (2) Predicting the number of voting sites per 1,000 people in a county

| | (1) All EV States b/se | (2) Non-SDR States b/se | (3) SDR States b/se |
|---|---|---|---|
| Same Day Registration | -0.406*** | | |
| | (0.044) | | |
| Republican SoS | -0.263*** | -0.085 | -1.490*** |
| | (0.083) | (0.128) | (0.136) |
| Percent Age 18-34 | -0.010*** | -0.013*** | -0.011*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Republican SoS × Percent Age 18-34 | -0.004** | -0.002 | 0.012*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Percent Age 65+ | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.004 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| Population Density | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Percent Black | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Percent Hispanic | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Percent High School Grad | -0.003** | -0.003** | -0.005*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Median Income | -0.000** | -0.000 | -0.000*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Poverty Rate | -0.002*** | -0.002*** | 0.000 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | 1.387*** | 1.312*** | 1.466*** |
| | (0.170) | (0.210) | (0.297) |
| State Constant | -1.043*** | -1.112*** | -0.678*** |
| | (0.120) | (0.133) | (0.226) |
| State Residual | -0.888*** | -0.830*** | -1.281*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.018) |
| Observations | 7080 | 5477 | 1603 |

Multilevel regression with counties nested in states. * 0.1 ** 0.05 ***0.01




Figure (1) Predicting the number of early voting sites per 1,000 people across different sizes of county youth populations using multilevel regression.




Figure (2) Predicting the number of early voting sites per 1,000 people in states with and without same-day registration across different sizes of county youth population using multilevel regression.




Figure (3) Predicting the number of early voting sites per 1,000 people in all early voting states across different sizes of the county youth population by whether the state Secretary of State (SoS) is a Republican using multilevel regression.




Figure (4) Predicting the number of early voting sites per 1,000 people in early voting states with same-day registration across different sizes of the county youth population by whether the state Secretary of State (SoS) is a Republican using multilevel regression.