The Cost of Electoral Confidence

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Abstract

What does it take to make American voters feel more confident in the electoral process? Recent work has explored questions along these lines, assessing voter trust as a function of information diets, endorsements of the electoral process by co-partisan elites, past experiences, modes of voting, and election outcomes. We investigate whether public opinion about the accuracy and security of elections in America are anchored by how much is spent on them. Applying this "price-quality" heuristic to the context of elections, we specifically test whether increased funding for elections increases voter confidence. Using a preregistered survey experiment fielded by YouGov on a sample of 2,000 American voters, we provide novel insights into what voters know about the sources of election funding, how they evaluate the competing fiscal demands of local governments, how they prioritize various tasks of election administration, and their support for proposals to increase elections funding. To our knowledge, this study represents the first instance in which such questions have been asked in an experimental context. The overall pattern of results suggest that voters are generally misinformed about how elections are funded; voters are divided on how election administrators can improve elections; and while voters generally view current levels of spending on election as excessive and are not motivated to broadly increase funding, spending on elections nevertheless factors into evaluations of election quality. Taken together, these findings shed light on what voters think about election administration and the capacity for money to shape attitudes about the electoral process.

Keywords: Election administration, public spending, voter confidence, trust in government, polarization

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Introduction

In August 2022, the Denver, Colorado City Council approved funding for a new ballot sorting machine with a total price tag of $398,000. As one advisor in the city clerk's office said, "There aren't any active problems with the current machines...Our office seeks to make sure we have up-to-date software and machine tools so that Denver voters can feel confident in their election administration" (Bloom, 2022). What does it take to make American voters feel confident in the electoral process? One solution, as demonstrated by the Denver City Council, has been to make financial investments to modernize election administration in this country. For example, in 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which provided a total of $3.2 billion in funding to states to meet new minimum standards for conducting elections. This funding enabled states to upgrade and purchase new voting equipment, develop centralized and computer-based voter registration files, improve the quality of voter education and information materials, and enhance recruitment and training efforts for election officials and poll workers (Alvarez and Grofman, 2014).

Initial work on voter confidence has explored voter trust in election administration and the accuracy and security of American elections as a function of how voters cast their ballots (Alvarez et al., 2008, 2021), evaluations of their own experiences at the polls (Atkeson and Saunders, 2007; Stein et al., 2008; Claassen et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2009; Rinfret et al., 2018; Stewart III and Dunham, 2019), information diets (Bowler and Donovan, 2016; Alvarez et al., 2021), election outcomes (Sances and Stewart, 2015; Sinclair et al., 2018), and endorsements of the electoral process by co-partisan elites (Clayton and Willer, 2023). We investigate whether individual voter appraisals about the accuracy and security of elections in the United States are anchored by how much is spent on them. Simply put, we explore whether voter confidence in the electoral process is a function of the cost of administering elections.

In each election year, election administrators must make budgetary tradeoffs between the administrative costs of maintaining election infrastructure and planning for the future (e.g., maintaining registration databases, upgrading voting equipment, improving reporting

systems, training officials) versus the costs of conducting each election (e.g., printing ballots, paying poll workers, renting polling places, mailing informational materials and ballots) (Mohr et al., 2018; Stewart III, 2022). Consequently, the extent of funding provided for conducting elections and how these funds are allocated can influence the manner in which voters cast their ballots and thus, their confidence in the electoral process. We give context and perspective to these decisions by exploring how they align with what voters believe are essential expenditures necessary to ensure integrity in the electoral process.

Here, we test a simple proposition: does "more money = more confidence?" Research in neuroscience, behavioral economics, and psychology suggests that consumers perceive higher priced products as being higher in quality (Rao and Monroe, 1989; Compeau and Grewal, 1998; Shiv et al., 2005; Plassmann et al., 2008; Gneezy et al., 2014; Cheslock and Riggs, 2021). Moreover, this "price-quality" heuristic has been shown to hold even when consumers have direct experiences with products (Hsee, 1996). We analogize such centrality of cost in evaluations to the conducting of elections, hypothesizing that increased spending on election administration increases voters' beliefs that elections are accurate, secure, and convenient.

In a novel, preregistered survey experiment fielded by YouGov on a sample of 2,000 American voters, we assess (1) variation in voter perceptions of electoral integrity when spending varies; (2) how voters evaluate current levels of and changes to the funding of elections; (3) how current levels of election spending are viewed in comparison to other fiscal demands of local governments; and (4) how voters believe election officials should prioritize time and money to improve how elections are managed. Our analyses considers moderating factors that may explain why some voters would be sensitive to the cost of elections, including global attitudes regarding government spending; existing levels of mistrust in government or belief in election denialism; prior voting experiences; perceptions of fraud and barriers to voting; and demographic characteristics such as partisanship. Given that most citizens may not have a frame of reference of the precise amount of money spent to conduct elections in the United States, we anticipate such a concern by providing respondents with recent data on the

amount of money necessary to conduct elections in the United States (Stewart III, 2022). Further, we test whether framing this information in per voter (egotropic) or aggregate (sociotropic) terms changes the effect of increased election spending on voter confidence (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981).

First, our results suggest that Americans are generally misinformed about how elections are funded in this country. Second, we find that most voters, regardless of party, are either satisfied with current levels of spending on elections or believe that current levels of spending are too high. Third, when asked to rank how election administrators should allocate their efforts if given additional time and money to improve how elections are run, we find that Democrats and Republicans vastly differ in their relative priorities. Fourth, our descriptive data reveal that Democratic voters indeed apply a "price-quality heursitic" in their opinion of American elections. Lastly, leveraging our series of experiments, we find mixed evidence of such a relationship overall, even when using varying communication strategies. Further, prevailing voter attitudes about elections appear to be motivated by other powerful political constructs such as the role of government, election denialism, and perception of systematic voter fraud and voting behaviors. Thus, this study show that even when voters are presented with additional funding for conducting elections, they are largely resistant to such changes and unlikely to find common ground on how to spend those funds.

Our contribution to this growing body of literature on electoral confidence is two-fold. First, we shed light on the extent to which voters' beliefs that elections are accurate, secure, and convenient are a function of the amount spent on conducting elections. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance in which these questions have been empirically and experimentally investigated. Thus, this work fills an important gap in the literature and furthers our understanding of how public officials can build public trust in elections. Second, we generate insights into what voters views as the most critical aspects of how elections are run to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, we theorize the mechanism by

which the cost of elections may shape voter confidence in the electoral process. Second, we the detail the design of our survey and explain how we test the relationship between cost and confidence. Finally, we provide an analysis of our results and explain how our findings provide both important normative and practical lessons in how budgetary considerations in election administration shape the degree to which Americans feel confident in the accuracy, security, and convenience of elections.

Theory and Literature

To the extent that American voters are aware of and recognize the effects of election funding, we can analogize voters as "consumers" and the cost of elections as a "price" paid to conduct higher "quality" elections. Literature in neuroscience, behavioral economics, and psychology has reported numerous examples in which consumers perceive higher priced products as being higher in quality (Gerstner, 1985; Rao and Monroe, 1989; Compeau and Grewal, 1998), thus demonstrating that consumers often use price as a proxy for quality when evaluating products. Experimental work suggests that consumers prefer higher priced products more (Rao and Monroe, 1989) and derive more actual benefits and pleasure from consuming higher priced products (Shiv et al., 2005; Plassmann et al., 2008). This "price-quality" heuristic is argued to be a rational tool for consumers to use (Scitovszky, 1944) given the direct and opportunity costs (Simon and Fassnacht, 2019) of product evaluation. The utility of the price-quality heuristic is strongest when consumers have less information about the product being evaluated, when the product is purchased infrequently, and when the product is desired (Compeau and Grewal, 1998; Krishna et al., 2002). Moreover, higher prices may set high consumer expectations for higher quality (Thaler, 1985; Gneezy et al., 2014). When products fail to meet those expectations, consumers may evaluate low-quality products with high prices more negatively than similar low-priced products (Gneezy et al., 2014).

In the context of American elections, we draw a connection between product quality and

voter confidence in the electoral process. To be more precise, we posit, in line with previous literature, that voters the electoral process along three dimensions: accuracy, security, and convenience. Key to these evaluations is how voters view their experiences in casting their ballot (Alvarez et al., 2021) and whether voters find election officials and poll workers helpful (Atkeson and Saunders, 2007; Stein et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2009). Moreover, how voters evaluate their voting experiences are colored by their familiarity with the electoral process (Alvarez et al., 2008), how it easy it is to complete a ballot (Atkeson and Saunders, 2007), and their method of voting. Voters casting absentee ballots or voting early often report less confidence that their ballots were accurately counted as compared those who vote in person on election day (Atkeson and Saunders, 2007; Alvarez et al., 2021). Voter confidence is even shaped by the technology used to cast ballots (Claassen et al., 2013; Atkeson and Saunders, 2007; Alvarez et al., 2008; Stewart III and Dunham, 2019, though see Beaulieu, 2016).

While these more egotropic centered considerations pertaining specifically to each voter's own experiences at the polls shape voter confidence in the electoral process, voter appraisals of the accuracy and security of elections may also be affected by more sociotropic considerations centered on the partisanship of voters. For example, in work examining the effects of voter identification requirements, Democrats in states with strict photo identification laws have been found to be less confident in the outcome of elections in their state (Bowler and Donovan, 2016), despite the fact most voters believe voter identification laws prevent fraud (Atkeson et al., 2014). More generally, national surveys have previously found that Republican voters are more confident that their votes was counted as intended (Bullock et al., 2005; Alvarez et al., 2008), however, that relationship has reversed in recent years (Stewart III, 2021). Partisanship has a dominating influence in evaluations of electoral confidence: voters who cast ballots for winning candidates express significantly more confidence that their ballots were correctly counted (Sances and Stewart, 2015), a relationship that holds even in the face of elite cues about election fairness (Sinclair et al., 2018).

Screening how voters view the electoral process is their perception of the prevalence of

fraud. Voters who have strong concerns about election fraud are less likely to express confidence in elections, particularly for those who are active on social media and closely follow the news. Following the news and social media usage influences voter confidence about the quality of elections at the county, state, and national-levels but does not influence voter beliefs that their own ballot was counted as intended (Alvarez et al., 2021). Underlying perceptions of fraud, political sophistication and belief in conspiracism influence voter confidence in the electoral process: more sophisticated voters express greater confidence in the accuracy of elections; voters who believe in conspiracies express less confidence (Sinclair et al., 2018).

Broadly, this discussion demonstrates the ways in which voter confidence is moderated. We hypothesize that the amount spent to conduct elections is an attribute that synthesizes the various considerations voters take into account when evaluating elections. Best estimates suggest that it will cost about $5.3 billion annually to conduct elections over the next ten years (Election Infrastructure Initiative, 2022; Stewart III, 2022). Using money appropriated primarily by state and local governments, this price tag covers both administrative costs of maintaining election infrastructure (e.g., maintaining registration databases; upgrading voting equipment; improving reporting systems; training officials) versus the costs of conducting each election (e.g., printing ballots, paying poll workers, renting polling places, mailing informational materials and ballots) (Mohr et al., 2018; Stewart III, 2022).

Of these items, it is investments in voting technology that are the clearest and most substantial product of election funding, not only determining the way voters complete their ballots, but also the speed and accuracy in which ballots are processed. As explained, the electronic equipment voters interact with in the voting booth can shape their confidence in the accuracy of elections. It is for this reason that the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) required states to phase out mechanical lever and punch-card voting machines in the aftermath of the 2000 and designated money explicitly for states to upgrade their voting equipment (Alvarez and Grofman, 2014). Even more so, while federal monies only amounted to about 4% of all election spending between 2003 and 2020, the funding provided by the

federal government helped states prepare against cybersecurity threats following the 2016 election and prepare for the increased use of mail voting in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic (Stewart III, 2022). Consequently, the extent of funding provided for conducting elections and how these funds are allocated can influence the manner in which voters cast their ballots.

In all, voters have little direct information about the electoral process as a whole. Elections are infrequent occasions and for those who have a lower propensity to vote than others, opportunities to observe how elections are conducted are limited. While they can easily evaluate the quality of their own experiences, voters have limited insights into the experience of other voters, especially those who live outsider their precinct, local jurisdiction, or state. In the absence of direct information, we posit that the cost of elections can be used a heuristic in evaluating the quality of elections. As the work in neuroscience, behavioral economics, and psychology suggests, using price as way to judge the quality of products and services is rational and intuitive.

Research Design and Data

Experimental Treatments

We relied on two experiments. In the first, and to test the differential effects of egotropic framing of the amount of money spent to conduct elections in the United States versus sociotropic, this portion of the study employed a 1 x 2 experimental design. All respondents were presented with a one-sentence statement informing them of the cost of administering a presidential election nationwide. Respondents were randomly assigned to see one of two conditions: *egotropic* or *sociotropic*. Those assigned to the *egotropic* condition saw the total cost as $5 billion. Random assignment ensured that equal numbers of participants are assigned to each of the conditions. Those assigned to the sociotropic condition saw the total cost as $30 per voter, on average. Both of these amounts are equivalent to each other

and are just displayed in different terms. The amounts shown to respondents reflect current estimates of the cost of conducting presidential elections (Election Infrastructure Initiative, 2022).

After respondents are shown the statement, they are asked, in three separate questions, to indicate how confident they are that elections are more accurate, secure, and convenient on a 4-point scale: (1) Not at all confident, (2) Not very confident, (3) Fairly confident, and (4) Very confident. Responses were rescaled (using min-max rescaling) to range from 0 to 1, allowing for easier comparison. Our confidence question provides respondents with an "I don't know option" which were treated as a missing response for the purpose of analysis.

In the second experiment, we devised a 2 x 2 factorial design to test the direct effect of *framing* and the direct effect of proposed increases in amount spent on elections (*% Δ Amount Spent*) on respondent attitudes on how elections are run in the United States All respondents were presented with a one-sentence statement describing a hypothetical proposal from legislators to increase spending on elections by a certain percentage, along with the numerical change in total amount of money spent on elections if the proposal is approved. The *framing* dimension has two levels: $5 billion (*sociotropic*) or $30 per voter, on average (*egotropic*) – these two values reflect the status quo amount spent on elections. The *% Δ Amount Spent* dimension has two levels: 5% (*low*) or 40% (*high*). Thus, respondents could be randomly assigned to see one of these four statements:

- *Sociotropic x Low*: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election spending by 5%, going from the present $5 billion to $5.25 billion"
- *Sociotropic x High*: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election spending by 40%, going from the present $5 billion to $7 billion"
- *Egotropic x Low*: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election spending by 5%, going from the present $30 per voter to $31.50 per voter"
- *Egotropic x High*: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election

spending by 40%, going from the present $30 per voter to $42 per voter"

After respondents are shown the statement, they were asked to respond to two questions. First, they were asked whether the proposed changes in election spending will improve or worsen how elections are run in this country. Second, they were then asked how strongly they support or oppose the proposed increase in the amount spend on elections. In evaluating respondent attitudes to hypothetical proposals to increase spending on elections, we use two outcome measures. First, "Change in Quality", measured on a 5 point scale: (1) Worsen a lot, (2) Worsen a little, (3) Remain the same, (4) Improve a little, and (5) Improve a lot. Second, "Proposal Support", measured on a 4 point scale: (1) Strongly oppose, (2) Somewhat oppose, (3) Somewhat support, and (4) Strongly support. We provide respondents with an "I don't know" option when asked to indicate their support for the shown proposal. For the purposes of analyis, "I don't know" responses were coded as a missing response. Responses were then rescaled (using min-max rescaling) to range from 0 to 1, allowing for easier comparison.

In addition to the above experimental components, we include a set of descriptive questions that give nuance to existing public opinion on the cost of election administration. For example, we ask respondents whether they agree or disagree (on a 4-point scale) that increased funding to run United States elections will make them feel more confident in the electoral process. Additionally, we ask respondents to use YouGov's allocation widgets to represent the proportion of funding for elections that they believe comes from federal, state, and local governments. Similarly, subjects are tasked with evaluating the level of spending on elections in this country relative to how state and local governments spend on other public programs. Given the main interest in empirically determining what voters need in elections to feel confident in their results, we ask respondents to rank six different aspects or categories in election administration by order of what they perceive to be the most important. Finally, we further test these preferences by asking participants whether they think that jurisdictions that spend more money to conduct elections have more accurate, secure, and convenient elections after we provide them with estimates of how much per voter two

state similarly sized spend to conduct elections (Election Infrastructure Initiative, 2022).

There is a myriad of reasons that may make some voters particularly sensitive to levels of government spending to conduct elections in this country, and we include six such potential sources of influence in our study. Specifically, we theorize that attitudes about costs may be filtered through a partisan lens and therefore we ask respondents for their party identification on a 7-point scale (we then collapse this into a conventional 3-point scale). We also consider that the believed importance or need to increase spending on election administration may be linked to whether voters believe those funds could be used to fix (1) perceived rampant fraud (questions 36-41, collapsed into a 0-1 index) and voter suppression (questions 30-35, collapsed into a 0-1 index), (2) electoral system that inaccurately resulted in Biden's victory, or (3) observed issues based on their personal voting experience (questions 25-29, collapsed into a 0-1 index). Finally, we test whether responses vary based on subjects' existing degree of political interest (question 45) and existing views of government (questions 19-24, collapsed into two separate 0-1 indices). The full text of the survey instrument can be found in Appendix A.

Sample

Our data were collected through a survey fielded by YouGov between February 27 and March 3, 2023. YouGov's initial recruitment pool consisted of 2,088 respondents who were then matched down to a final group of 2,000 respondents via a stratified sampling from the 2019 American Community Survey based on gender, age, race, and education. We conducted the analyses that follow on the weights provided by YouGov. Given the depth and breadth of our experimental design, we include three attention checks throughout our survey (Berinsky et al., 2021). Note that even if respondents failed any of these attention checks, they were still included in the final sample. However, our analyses are delimited only to respondents that successfully passed all three attention checks. Approximately 91% of respondents were



Figure 1: Knowledge of Current Spending by Level of Government

attentive, resulting in a final sample of 1,813 respondents.[1] In our pre-analysis plan, we conducted a power analysis based on a 2,000 respondent sample. See Appendix B for our original and updated power estimates.

Results

Given that our primary interest in this paper is the sensitivity to changes to the funding of election administration in this country, we begin our analyses by exploring preexisting opinions and knowledge of current levels of government spending.

First, we find that voters have a clearly defined frame of reference regarding the contri-

[1]The analyses in the main body of the content reflect the responses of "attentive" responses. See Appendices C, D, and E for analyses including all respondents.



Figure 2: Evaluations of Current Levels of Local Government Spending

butions of government to the funding of elections. As illustrated by Figure 1, respondents, believe that the federal government currently contributes, on (weighted) average, 44.0% of the total funding for elections conducted in the United States, whereas they think state governments contribute 33.3% and local governments contribute 22.7%. However, recent estimates suggest that the inverse is true as the federal government has the smallest role in funding elections, contributing a mere 4% of total funding (Stewart III, 2022). Thus, this finding suggests that voters are generally misinformed about how we fund elections in this country. There are two implications of this finding. First, their responses to our experimental interventions will be shaped by these misconceptions about the role of governments in providing fiscal resources for election administration. Second, these misconceptions might have a priming effect based on how respondents view the role each level of government should have in their everyday lives, including how they get to vote.

Next, we consider how respondents evaluate the competing fiscal demands of state and local governments. The pattern of results in Figure 2 suggest that a plurality of voters believe current levels of spending to administer general elections are excessive. In particular, we find that 47.6% of voters believe that governments spend too much on administering general



Figure 3: Evaluations of Current Levels of Local Government Spending (by Respondent Party ID)

elections whereas a mere 8.3% feel that governments spend too little. When we also take into account the proportion of respondents that are satisfied with current spending, this implies that a large majority of respondents (91.7%) would not be amenable to proposed increases in election funding. Given that attitudes regarding the allocation of government spending tends to be a reflection of individual priorities, we next examine how Republican and Democratic voters each evaluate levels of spending on the variety of services governments provide to the public. Despite a well-established difference in views of government spending and its role (Green et al., 2002; Stimson, 2015; Jacoby, 1994), both Democrats and Republicans would likely not be supportive of measures that provide increased funding for elections. Specifically, only 11.3% of Democratic respondents and 5.8% of Republican



Figure 4: Ranking Priorities for Election Administrators' Time and Money

respondents believe government spending on elections is too low. Not only does this finding indicate that respondents would be resistant to large increases in funding, but rather that respondents would not be supportive of even modest increases in funding. Simply put, these data suggest that voters view any *additional* spending on election administration is unwarranted. However, respondents' aversion to these large quantities of spending implies that they may be receptive to any framing strategy that depicts spending on a more personal frame of reference.

Beyond appraisals of current levels of spending on elections in the aggregate, it may be the case that voters have clearly defined attitudes in how election administrators should prioritize their efforts if provided additional resources. As shown in Figure 4, when asked



Figure 5: Ranking Priorities for Election Administrators' Time and Money (by Respondent Party ID)

to rank to the relative importance of the different aspects necessary to conduct elections, a plurality of respondents (31.9%) ranked "voter registration" as the foremost priority if election administrators were given additional time and money to improve how elections are run. Conversely, "post-election audits and recounts" was most frequently ranked as the lowest priority by respondents (33.9%). As before, we examine whether Democratic and Republican voters have similar views on what improves elections. Notably, Figure 5 highlights that there is indeed a diametrical partisan divide: on five out of the six categories shown to respondents, Democrats and Republicans vastly differ in what is most important for

improving how elections are run.[2] For example, 23.0% of Democrats ranked "absentee/by-mail voting" as their first priority, with just 10.8% of Democrats ranking this category as their lowest priority. Yet, just 8.4% of Republicans rank "absentee/by-mail voting" as their first priority, with approximately 36.1% ranking the category as their lowest priority. Considering the two categories most relevant to recent discussions focused on the integrity of elections, our data find that only 15.2% of Democrats rank either "voting machines" or "post-election audits and recounts" as the most imperative tasks for election administrators. However, 37.2% of Republican respondents ranked either "voting machines" or "post-election audits and recounts" as what should be the primary focus of election administration toward improving how elections are conducted. It is unsurprising that Democrats would overlook issues of tabulations and instead 36.2% of Democrats would rank "voter registration" as the central task for election administrators.[3] Interestingly, however, neither of these two methods central to ensuring the accuracy of vote counts appears among the primary focus of Republicans in spite of the fact that they have been a mainstay talking point among Republican elites and conservative media since the 2020 election. Overall, these results suggest that even when provided the opportunity to increase funding on elections, Americans are unlikely to find common ground on how to allocate such an influx of fiscal resources. Thus, if voters do indeed evaluate the performance of elections based on "price" or the cost of elections, they are also doing so along differing set of criteria.

To more directly examine the relationship between the cost of elections and voter confidence, we then ask respondents a simple question: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: increasing funding to run elections in the United States will make me feel more confident in the electoral process." On first glance and as indicated by the green bars in Figure 6, a majority of respondents (59.0%) would either disagree or somewhat dis-

[2]This is consistent with work from the Pew Research Center finding that 56% of Republican supporters think that elections will be administered well in the United States compared to 88% among Democratic supporters (Pew Research Center, 2022).

[3]See Alvarez et al. (2008) for data demonstrating partisan divides in voter confidence about the accuracy of ballot counting. This would explain why 64.8% of Democratic respondents ranked "voting machines" and "post-election audits and recounts" as their lowest priority.



Figure 6: Does increasing funding to run elections in the United States will make me feel more confident in the electoral process?

agree that increased funding would make them feel more confident in the conduct of election. However, a closer look at the data suggests that there is sensitivity along partisan lines to this question: 59.4% of Democrats would either agree or somewhat agree that increased funding would make them feel more confident in the electoral process while 73.9% of Republicans would either disagree or somewhat disagree with this supposition. Considering the broader question of whether "more money = more confidence," this pattern of results reveals that partisan identification conditions the relationship between the funding of elections and voter confidence in the electoral process. The subsequent set of analyses further interrogates the relationships highlighted by these preceding results.

Our initial findings suggest that voters are broadly satisfied with or believe too much is

Table 1: Effects of Framing on Views of Current Costs

	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.009	0.010	0.008
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.018)
N	1563	1557	1524
R^2	0	0	0

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

spent on conducting elections. As outlined above, we theorize that communicating election funding using an aggregate metric (sociotropic) versus an individual-level metric (egotropic) may have a substantively meaningful impact on voter evaluations of election performance. To that end, we first provide respondents with a recent estimate of what it costs to administer a national general election (Election Infrastructure Initiative, 2022; Stewart III, 2022), randomizing whether the amount described is in terms of the national cost (in billions) versus individual, per-voter cost (in dollars). We then ask respondents whether this level of current spending makes elections more accurate, secure, and convenient. As reported across the three columns of Table 1, which displays the effect of framing on level of confidence using an OLS model, there is insufficient evidence in support of this hypothesis. Thus, it may be the case that the general aversion about the amount spent on conducting elections may counteract the effects of any potential communication strategy. Further testing the robustness of this conclusion, we supplement this analysis by considering a range of possible moderators that may interact with this experimental intervention. To our knowledge, this study represents the first instance in which these powerful political constructs have been utilized within an experimental context, some of which have never been contemplated as influencing voter confidence. For example, belief in fraud, attitudes about the role of government, and perceptions of systematic voting barriers all have large and statistically significant negative effects on voter confidence, so much so that framing has no effect (at standard levels of statistical significance) across all three outcomes of interest (via linear regression; see Appendix

Table 2: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.010	0.000	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.023)
High Proposal	−0.002	0.040	−0.016
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.029	0.005	−0.008
	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.037)
N	1813	900	649
R^2	0.002	0.009	0.002

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

C for these robustness checks). Nevertheless, these messaging strategies may have greater resonance when attached to a call to action.

We then test whether framing has an effect on voter evaluations of election quality (given varying levels of proposed increases to the funding of elections). When asked whether allocating more funds to the administration of elections will improve or worsen how elections are run in this country, we observe no meaningful interaction between the two experimental conditions, as indicated in Table 2. That is, presenting respondents with proposed increases that vary in order of magnitude (an increased of 5% versus 40%) and frame of reference (sociotropic versus egotropic framing) has no statistically significant effect on respondents' belief such measures will improve the performance of American elections. As before, we use a linear model to estimate whether these treatments are moderated by a variety of potentially impactful sets of political beliefs, yet again the pattern of results hold and we detect no observable interaction effects. Consequently, these data underscore there is a deeply and entrenched resistance to increased funding of elections, independent of the amount and choice of messaging strategy. Moreover, the lack of an observed relationship between proposed spending increases and their capacity to improve how elections are run, gives context to an ability to move public opinion on proposed increases to election funding. Specifically, as shown in Table 3, voters were, on average, more likely to reject legislative propositions with

Table 3: Effects of Increased Spending on Support for Funding Proposals

	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
High Proposal	−0.025	−0.032	−0.049
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.026)
N	1431	712	526
R^2	0.001	0.002	0.007

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

larger increases in election funding, though this finding fails to achieve statistical significance. Notably, the more respondents believe in the prevalence of systematic voting barriers, the more likely they are to support proposals that increase funding by larger amounts (see Table E-33 in Appendix E). While we are hesitant to draw generalizations from this finding, the heterogeneous treatment effects observed in this model implies that, at least among this subset of the electorate, more money can be used to more effectively limit practices that disenfranchise voters.



Figure 7: Evaluating State Election by Amount Spent per Voter

Our final inquiry more directly engages with the simple premise of this study—whether increasing funding for elections increases voter confidence. When asked to compare two hypothetical states of equal size that differ on the amount each spends per voter to conduct elections, we find mixed evidence for this hypothesis. On the one hand, comparing pairwise differences in proportions, the state that invests the most per voter to conduct elections evoked the most confidence that they could conduct *convenient* elections (see the top row in Figure 7). On the other hand, this relationship did not hold in evaluations of accuracy and security as subject responses yielded no meaningful differences between states and their respective levels of spending. Critically, it is important to note that in no instance, the state that spends a lower amount to conduct elections elicit more than 15% support from respondents. This pattern of results evinces the theorized relevance of the "price-quality" heuristic in global evaluations of election administration. Furthermore, the notion that states that spend more on elections are likely to conduct more convenient elections lends support for the idea that more money has the perceived capability of reducing barriers to electoral participation.

Discussion

Taken together, this study has reached three central conclusions. First, among American voters, there is a firm belief that governments already spend too much to conduct elections. Thus, it appears that public messaging strategies emphasizing government investment in election administration is not an avenue to increase public trust in elections. Second, our results provide mixed evidence for the relevance of the "price-quality heursitic" in global evaluations of election administration. That is, while this study did not find sufficient statistical evidence suggesting voters believe increased election funding will improve how elections are run in this country, voters do appear to be less confident in the accuracy, security, and convenience of elections in states that spend less to conduct elections. Third, our results

indicate that there is a clear partisan divide in the relative priorities among voters in how election administrators can improve elections in the United States. This suggests that even when offered more funds for conducting elections, Americans are unlikely to find common ground on which aspects of election administration are more important.

There are two central limitations to this study. First, there might be concerns about our design's external validity, namely, whether voters do in fact think about the cost of elections. To that end, we anticipate such concerns by providing respondents with informational benchmarks in the course of our survey instrument about current levels of spending to conduct elections. This is consistent with similar protocols applied to studies measuring public opinion on public spending (e.g., Bonica, 2015). Moreover, election funding is in fact part of recent popular discourse.[4] Second, our study only ask respondents to consider increases to election funding. By design, this choice excludes the ways in which both decreases in spending and changes to spending on specific aspects of election administration may shape public opinion regarding the cost of elections. Thus, since our initial survey results suggest that voters believe current levels of spending to conduct elections is too high, future research should explore whether decreasing funding resonates with voters. Lastly, the phrasing of our experimental intervention—"the cost of administering a presidential election"—is perhaps abstract enough to invite differing interpretations, such as being the amount spent by political candidates on their campaigns. Consequently, further work could explore whether voters have adverse reactions to any type of election (administrative and campaign alike) spending.

Overall, this study contributes to a large, but growing literature centered on what it takes to make voters feel more confident in the electoral process. Prior research has focused primarily examined this through the lens of voter access (e.g., voter identification requirements) and experiences (e.g., voting technology). This emphasis has overlooked the very mechanism by which election administration is possible: the funding of elections. Furthermore, our findings are consistent with recent work that similarly demonstrates a growing

[4]Discussions of how to improve the voter experience and its associated costs is increasingly a focal point in news media (see Warikoo (2022); Miller (2023); Contreras (2023); Jones (2023)).

polarization over election administration, something that was once thought politically neutral. In practical terms, public officials should consider these partisan nuances when crafting election administration budgets, rather than thinking that they can just use money to placate voter concerns.

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Online Appendix for "The Cost of Electoral Confidence"

Contents

A Survey Instrument

KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT FUNDING

(1) Using the tool below, please enter the percent of total funding for elections conducted in the United States you believe each level of government is CURRENTLY contributing?

- Federal government
- State governments
- Local governments

VIEWS ON CURRENT COSTS

Sociotropic: A recent report issued by researchers at MIT indicated that the cost of administering a presidential election nationwide is about $5 billion. Please indicate how confident you are that this level of spending makes elections:
Egotropic: A recent report issued by researchers at MIT indicated that the cost of administering a presidential election nationwide is about $30 per voter, on average. Please indicate how confident you are that this level of spending makes elections:
(2) More accurate
(3) More secure
(4) More convenient

1/2 of respondents will be assigned to see the **Sociotropic** prompt, other 1/2 of respondents will the **Egotropic prompt**.

- Not at all confident
- Not very confident
- Fairly confident
- Very confident
- I don't know

STATE COMPARISONS

In another report, it was estimated that one state spends about $10 per voter, on average, to conduct elections in a given year (**State A**), while another state with a similar number of voters spends about $2 per voter (**State B**).
(5) Which state is likely to have more accurate elections?
(6) Which state is likely to have more secure elections?
(7) Which state is likely to have more convenient elections?

The order in which (5), (6), and (7) are displayed in the grid-style question will be randomized across respondents.

- State A
- State B
- Both states about even

IMPROVING VIA PROPOSALS

Sociotropic x Low: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election spending by 5%, going from the present $5 billion to $5.25 billion"
Sociotropic x High: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election spending by 40%, going from the present $5 billion to $7 billion"
Egotropic x Low: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election spending by 5%, going from the present $30 per voter to $31.50 per voter"
Egotropic x High: "Suppose lawmakers were considering a proposal to increase election spending by 40%, going from the present $30 per voter to $42 per voter"

(8) If this proposal is approved, how elections are run in this country will...

Respondents will be randomly assigned to see either **Low** or **High**. The framing condition of **Sociotropic** or **Egotropic** was assigned in the **VIEWS ON CURRENT COSTS** block. Thus, only one of the four prompts below will be shown before (8) to each respondent.

- Improve a lot
- Improve a little
- Remain the same
- Worsen a little
- Worsen a lot

PROPOSAL SUPPORT

Low: (9) Would you support this proposal to increase the amount of money spent on running elections by 5%?
High: (10) Would you support this proposal to increase the amount of money spent on running elections by 40%?

Respondents exposed to either **Low** or **High** depending on what they were assigned to in the **IMPROVING VIA PROPOSALS** block.

- Strongly support

- Somewhat support
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose
- I don't know

EVALUTAING OTHER LOCAL SPENDING

State and local governments spend money on a variety of goods, programs, and services to support the American public. Do you think that the current levels of spending on the following, as reported by the US Census of Governments, is too low, about right, or too high?

(11) $5 billion in total to administer a presidential election
(12) $11 billion in total to operate libraries
(13) $34 billion to operate parks and recreation departments
(14) $1.8 billion in total to operate public parking facilities
(15) $110 billion in total to operate police departments
(16) $599 billion in total to operate schools

The order in which (11)-(16) are displayed in the grid-style question is randomized across respondents.

- It is too low
- It is about right
- It is too high

RANKING PRIORITIES

(17) If election officials had more time and money to improve how elections are managed in this country, how should they allocate their additional efforts? Please rank the following items in terms of their importance (You may rank as many or as few as you like).

The order of the six response options will be randomized across respondents. Respondents will rank the options using YouGov's Ranking Widget.

- Voter registration
- Early in-person voting
- Absentee/by-mail voting
- Polling place management

- Post-election audits and recounts
- Voting machines

CONFIDENCE

(18) Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: increasing funding to run elections in the United States will make me feel more confident in the electoral process.

- Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Agree

GOVERNMENT WASTE

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.
(19) "People in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes"
(20) "Government often spends taxpayer money wisely"
(21) "Taxpayers do not often experience the benefits of government spending."

The order in which (19)-(21) are displayed in the grid-style question is randomized across respondents. The five response options are reversed across respondents.

- Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Agree

GOVERNMENT BENEVOLENCE

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.
(22) "Government often uses taxpayer money to do the most good for the most citizens"
(23) "One central responsibility of government is to ensure that all its citizens have a basic level of food, shelter, and health care"
(24) "People like me don't have much say in what government does"

The order in which (22)-(24) are displayed in the grid-style question is randomized across respondents. The five response options are reversed across respondents.

- Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Agree

DEMOGRAPHICS/MODERATORS

(25) Which of the following statements best describes you?

- I did not vote in the election this November
- I thought about voting this time, but didn't
- I usually vote, but didn't this time
- I tried to vote, but was not allowed to when I tried
- I tried to vote, but it ended up being too much trouble
- I definitely voted in the November 2022 General Election

(26) How did you vote, or try to vote, in this election?

(26) is only shown to respondents who selected "I tried to vote, but was not allowed to when I tried", "I tried to vote, but it ended up being too much trouble," or "I definitely voted in the November 2022 General Election" in (25).

- Voted in person on Election Day (at a polling place or precinct)
- Voted in person before Election Day
- Voted by mail or absentee ballot by mail
- I don't know

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

(27) "In this election, I found it convenient to cast my vote."
(28) "In this election, my vote was cast accurately."
(29) "In this election, there was widespread voter fraud."

Only respondents who responded with "I definitely voted in the November 2022 General Election" in (24) are asked to answer (26), (27), and (28). The order in which (27)-(29) is displayed in the grid-style question is randomized across respondents.

- Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Agree

The following is a list of potential reasons for why a voter could not vote. Please indicate how often you think these situations occur.
(30) "Waiting in long lines to cast votes in person"
(31) "Living far from assigned polling location"
(32) "Not having required voter identification documentation"
(33) "Finding it too hard to or being unable to request absentee ballots or vote by mail"
(34) "Being removed from the voter registration list without notice"
(35) "Polling locations opening too late in the morning or closing too early in the evening"

- It is very common
- It occurs occasionally
- It occurs infrequently
- It almost never occurs
- I'm not sure

The order in which (30)-(35) is displayed in the grid-style question is randomized across respondents.

The following is a list of activities that are usually against the law. Please indicate how often you think these activities occur.
(36) "People voting more than once in an election"
(37) "People stealing or tampering with ballots that have been cast"
(38) "People pretending to be someone else when going to vote"
(39) "People voting who are not United States citizens "
(40) "People casting an absentee ballot intended for another person"
(41) "Officials changing the reported vote count in a way that is not a true reflection of the ballots that were actually counted"

The order in which (36)-(41) is displayed in the grid-style question is randomized across respondents.

- It is very common
- It occurs occasionally
- It occurs infrequently
- It almost never occurs
- I'm not sure

(42) Do you own your home, pay rent, or have some other living arrangement?

- Own home
- Pay rent
- Other (SPECIFY)

(43) Does a health problem, disability, or handicap CURRENTLY keep you from participating fully in work, school, housework, or other activities?

- Yes
- No

(44) How confident are you that the votes for president were accurately cast and counted nationwide in the **2020** election?

- Extremely confident
- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

(45) How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you...

- Very interested
- Somewhat interested
- Not very interested

- Not at all interested

In this grid below, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:

(46) "Billionaire George Soros is behind a hidden plot to destabilize the American government, take control of the media, and put the world under his control"
(47) "Donald Trump is waging a secret war against elite Satan-worshiping pedophiles in government, business and the media"
(48) "In the 2020 election, some voting machines purposely flipped votes from President Trump to President Biden"
(49) "Mail ballots are regularly cast in the names of dead people in United States elections"
(50) "Antifa stormed the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021"
(51) "Thousands of voters cast multiple ballots in United States elections"
(52) "Election administrators rig elections in favor of one party."

The order in which (46)-(52) is displayed in the grid-style question is randomized across respondents.

- Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Agree

(53) Whose responsibility is it to decide if a law is constitutional or not?

The order of the response options is randomized across respondents.

- The President
- Congress
- The Supreme Court

(54) Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to Federal Courts?

The order of the response options is randomized across respondents.

- The President
- Congress

- The Supreme Court

(55) Do you know what job or political office is currently held by Chuck Schumer? Is it:

The order of the response options is randomized across respondents.

- Speaker of the House
- Secretary of the Treasury
- Senate Majority Leader
- Justice of the Supreme Court
- Governor of New York

(56) Do you know what job or political office is currently held by Janet Yellen? Is it:

The order of the response options is randomized across respondents.

- Attorney General
- Justice of the Supreme Court
- Secretary of the Treasury
- House Republican Leader
- Secretary of State

ATTENTION CHECKS

We have employed three attention checks that will be randomly presented to respondents within and between the modules of our fielded survey.

(AC1) Please select Agree to show you are paying attention to the question.

- Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Agree

(AC2) Please enter the following number into the text box below: 15.

(AC3) To show that you are paying attention to this survey, please select seven below. (scale from 1 to 10)

B Power Analysis

Table B-1: **Power analysis by effect size and standard deviation**

Standard Deviation	Total Sample Size	Minimum Detectable Effect (Power-Sig. Level: 0.80, .05)
1.0	1813	.132
1.0	2000	.125
0.75	1813	.099
0.75	2000	.094
0.5	1813	.066
0.5	2000	.063
0.25	1813	.033
0.25	2000	.031

C Moderators: Views of Current Costs

Table C-2: Effects of Framing by Perceptions of Government Waste on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.030	0.051	0.079	0.055	0.086	0.046
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Gov. Waste	−0.763***	−0.779***	−0.433***	−0.708***	−0.736***	−0.444***
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Egotropic x Gov. Waste	−0.021	−0.044	−0.087	−0.049	−0.086	−0.060
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.068)
N	1563	1557	1524	1718	1706	1681
R^2	0.246	0.258	0.108	0.229	0.251	0.108

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-3: Effects of Framing by Perceptions of Government Benevolence on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.030	0.051	0.079	0.055	0.086	0.046
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Gov. Waste	−0.763***	−0.779***	−0.433***	−0.708***	−0.736***	−0.444***
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Egotropic x Gov. Waste	−0.021	−0.044	−0.087	−0.049	−0.086	−0.060
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.068)
N	1563	1557	1524	1718	1706	1681
R^2	0.246	0.258	0.108	0.229	0.251	0.108

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-4: Effects of Framing by Participation in 2022 General Election on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	−0.037	−0.033	−0.028	−0.005	−0.017	−0.060
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Voted in 2022	−0.043	−0.031	−0.011	−0.043	−0.051	−0.041
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Egotropic x Voted in 2022	0.060	0.057	0.048	0.022	0.039	0.078
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)
N	1563	1557	1524	1718	1706	1681
R^2	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.003

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-5: Effects of Framing by 2022 Vote Mode on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.007	0.003	0.039	0.001	−0.004	0.030
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Voted Early in 2022	−0.098*	−0.104*	−0.053	−0.078	−0.085*	−0.041
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Egotropic x Voted Early in 2022	0.069	0.116	0.058	0.052	0.114	0.052
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.054)
Voted In-person in 2022	−0.113**	−0.084*	−0.020	−0.114***	−0.088*	−0.030
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Egotropic x Voted In-person in 2022	−0.003	−0.026	−0.062	0.006	−0.020	−0.049
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.045)
N	1255	1250	1232	1347	1339	1325
R^2	0.022	0.019	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-6: Effects of Framing by 2022 Voting Convenience on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	−0.154	−0.259*	−0.105	−0.190	−0.187	−0.058
	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.116)	(0.132)	(0.115)
2022 Voting Convenience	0.063	0.049	0.105	0.031	0.018	0.074
	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.076)
Egotropic x 2022 Voting Convenience	0.201	0.319**	0.141	0.235	0.238	0.089
	(0.135)	(0.122)	(0.112)	(0.126)	(0.144)	(0.125)
N	1226	1220	1204	1299	1291	1278
R^2	0.012	0.021	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.007

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-7: Effects of Framing by Accuracy of 2022 Voting on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	−0.071	−0.079	−0.121	−0.113	−0.121	−0.129
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.073)
2022 Vote Accuracy	0.550***	0.583***	0.285***	0.498***	0.530***	0.284***
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Egotropic x 2022 Vote Accuracy	0.125	0.136	0.174*	0.168	0.182*	0.183*
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.083)
N	1226	1220	1204	1299	1291	1278
R^2	0.169	0.184	0.075	0.155	0.17	0.076

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-8: Effects of Framing by Perception of Fraud in 2022 on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.032	0.045	0.030	0.031	0.047*	0.032
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
2022 Voting Fraud	−0.540***	−0.537***	−0.255***	−0.491***	−0.492***	−0.233***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Egotropic x 2022 Voting Fraud	0.027	−0.014	−0.004	0.007	−0.027	−0.012
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.054)
N	1224	1218	1202	1297	1289	1276
R^2	0.297	0.306	0.083	0.258	0.265	0.071

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-9: Effects of Framing by Perceptions of Systemic Voting Barriers on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.032	0.045	0.030	0.031	0.047*	0.032
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
2022 Voting Fraud	−0.540***	−0.537***	−0.255***	−0.491***	−0.492***	−0.233***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Egotropic x 2022 Voting Fraud	0.027	−0.014	−0.004	0.007	−0.027	−0.012
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.054)
N	1224	1218	1202	1297	1289	1276
R^2	0.297	0.306	0.083	0.258	0.265	0.071

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-10: Effects of Framing by Perceptions of Systemic Voter Fraud on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.032	0.049	0.029	0.038	0.062*	0.020
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Perceptions of Fraud	−0.589***	−0.596***	−0.261***	−0.531***	−0.532***	−0.224***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Egotropic x Perceptions of Fraud	−0.002	−0.039	−0.027	−0.024	−0.081	−0.040
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.056)
N	1520	1512	1480	1667	1655	1629
R^2	0.298	0.311	0.074	0.25	0.264	0.057

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-11: Effects of Framing by Election Denialism on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.032	0.030	0.049	0.034	0.030	0.030
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Election Denialism	−0.509***	−0.515***	−0.216***	−0.494***	−0.506***	−0.229***
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Egotropic x Election Denialism	−0.030	−0.038	−0.074	−0.033	−0.035	−0.057
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.042)
N	1513	1506	1481	1658	1644	1628
R^2	0.378	0.376	0.102	0.352	0.353	0.102

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-12: Effects of Framing by Political Interest on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.028	0.011	0.009	0.029	0.009	−0.022
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Political Interest	0.096*	0.099*	0.087*	0.111*	0.101*	0.081
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Egotropic x Political Interest	−0.025	0.001	0.000	−0.024	0.006	0.029
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.061)
N	1563	1557	1524	1718	1706	1681
R^2	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.008

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table C-13: Effects of Framing by Political Knowledge on Views of Current Costs

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	Accurate	Secure	Convenient	Accurate	Secure	Convenient
Egotropic	0.003	−0.004	0.013	0.025	0.015	−0.031
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.047)
Political Knowledge	−0.037	−0.081	−0.045	−0.049	−0.105*	−0.084*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Egotropic x Political Knowledge	0.007	0.017	−0.006	−0.019	−0.005	0.039
	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.058)
N	1563	1557	1524	1718	1706	1681
R^2	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.009	0.004

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

D Moderators: Framing and Increased Spending

Table D-14: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Perceptions of Government Waste on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.042	−0.075	−0.024	0.004	−0.029	0.026
	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.143)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.117)
Gov. Waste	−0.358***	−0.267***	−0.279*	−0.341***	−0.237***	−0.299**
	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.120)	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.099)
Egotropic x Gov. Waste	0.043	0.113	0.020	−0.007	0.051	−0.028
	(0.060)	(0.079)	(0.155)	(0.064)	(0.089)	(0.128)
High Proposal x Gov. Waste	−0.124	−0.081	−0.104	−0.087	−0.087	−0.098
	(0.067)	(0.093)	(0.171)	(0.068)	(0.099)	(0.135)
High Proposal	0.094	0.089	0.073	0.055	0.068	0.072
	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.156)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.121)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.021	0.100	0.037	0.010	0.076	−0.083
	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.213)	(0.078)	(0.097)	(0.182)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Gov. Waste	0.014	−0.118	−0.046	0.027	−0.064	0.079
	(0.099)	(0.130)	(0.236)	(0.098)	(0.134)	(0.204)
N	1813	900	649	2000	987	713
R^2	0.149	0.109	0.074	0.134	0.087	0.095

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-15: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Perceptions of Government Benevolence on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.024	−0.038	−0.021	−0.011	0.010	−0.029
	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.032)	(0.067)	(0.041)
Gov. Benevolence	0.378***	0.289***	0.323***	0.386***	0.284***	0.330***
	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Egotropic x Gov. Benevolence	0.025	0.064	0.027	0.018	−0.012	0.077
	(0.062)	(0.097)	(0.108)	(0.065)	(0.117)	(0.101)
High Proposal x Gov. Benevolence	0.201**	0.127	0.197	0.178**	0.189	0.172
	(0.067)	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.068)	(0.123)	(0.111)
High Proposal	−0.080*	−0.039	−0.059	−0.076*	−0.090	−0.049
	(0.032)	(0.069)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.071)	(0.042)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.084	0.069	0.107	0.065	0.057	0.101
	(0.048)	(0.095)	(0.066)	(0.048)	(0.102)	(0.064)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Gov. Benevolence	−0.144	−0.097	−0.372	−0.113	−0.055	−0.384*
	(0.099)	(0.167)	(0.192)	(0.099)	(0.176)	(0.181)
N	1813	900	649	2000	987	713
R^2	0.187	0.097	0.123	0.174	0.089	0.134

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-16: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Participation in 2022 General Election on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.058	0.006	−0.090	−0.026	0.029	−0.060
	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.054)
Voted in 2022	−0.038	0.011	−0.108*	−0.038	0.024	−0.124**
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.040)
Egotropic x Voted in 2022	0.064	−0.009	0.117	0.035	−0.031	0.097
	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.059)
High Proposal x Voted in 2022	0.022	0.065	0.027	0.034	0.103	0.028
	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.060)
High Proposal	−0.018	−0.012	−0.037	−0.029	−0.059	−0.023
	(0.037)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.104*	0.044	0.098	0.077	0.082	0.028
	(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.049)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Voted in 2022	−0.103	−0.048	−0.140	−0.081	−0.082	−0.089
	(0.059)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.056)	(0.086)	(0.087)
N	1812	899	649	1999	986	713
R^2	0.007	0.015	0.029	0.005	0.02	0.034

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-17: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by 2022 Vote Mode on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	0.025	0.044	−0.007	0.017	0.026	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.042)
Voted Early in 2022	−0.006	0.005	0.009	−0.007	−0.007	0.023
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Egotropic x Voted Early in 2022	−0.048	−0.045	−0.043	−0.002	0.016	−0.031
	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.045)	(0.064)	(0.065)
High Proposal x Voted Early in 2022	0.009	0.052	0.017	0.037	0.075	0.064
	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.079)
Voted In-person in 2022	−0.018	0.072*	−0.050	−0.015	0.082*	−0.051
	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Egotropic x Voted In-person in 2022	−0.018	−0.092*	0.082	−0.013	−0.083	0.078
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.055)
High Proposal x Voted In-person in 2022	−0.008	0.001	0.013	−0.002	−0.011	0.055
	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.069)
High Proposal	0.006	0.033	−0.022	−0.004	0.019	−0.042
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.058)
Egotropic x High Proposal	−0.014	−0.006	0.006	0.010	0.018	0.039
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.079)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.081)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Voted Early in 2022	0.077	−0.010	0.046	−0.020	−0.083	−0.046
	(0.071)	(0.093)	(0.117)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.115)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Voted In-person in 2022	−0.003	0.036	−0.098	−0.018	0.034	−0.153
	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.096)	(0.061)	(0.077)	(0.098)
N	1425	748	511	1525	800	547
R^2	0.008	0.027	0.024	0.006	0.023	0.027

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-18: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by 2022 Voting Convenience on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.097	0.005	−0.256	0.011	0.134	−0.185
	(0.085)	(0.111)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.165)	(0.123)
2022 Voting Convenience	0.057	0.154	−0.073	0.038	0.138	−0.093
	(0.059)	(0.080)	(0.094)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.094)
Egotropic x 2022 Voting Convenience	0.115	−0.007	0.314*	−0.002	−0.151	0.249
	(0.091)	(0.118)	(0.142)	(0.132)	(0.175)	(0.134)
High Proposal x 2022 Voting Convenience	−0.075	−0.062	−0.035	−0.065	−0.047	−0.090
	(0.115)	(0.171)	(0.230)	(0.109)	(0.169)	(0.192)
High Proposal	0.072	0.110	0.024	0.064	0.086	0.087
	(0.106)	(0.159)	(0.219)	(0.100)	(0.157)	(0.180)
Egotropic x High Proposal	−0.037	−0.128	0.159	−0.153	−0.247	0.018
	(0.141)	(0.201)	(0.265)	(0.160)	(0.231)	(0.223)
Egotropic x High Proposal x 2022 Voting Convenience	0.044	0.137	−0.227	0.169	0.276	−0.093
	(0.152)	(0.215)	(0.283)	(0.173)	(0.247)	(0.241)
N	1395	732	501	1476	777	530
R^2	0.01	0.037	0.02	0.005	0.025	0.019

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-19: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Accuracy of 2022 Voting on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.116	−0.054	−0.150*	−0.089	−0.070	−0.110
	(0.062)	(0.179)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.166)	(0.066)
2022 Vote Accuracy	0.149***	0.099	0.017	0.169***	0.117	0.025
	(0.041)	(0.085)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.085)	(0.044)
Egotropic x 2022 Vote Accuracy	0.144*	0.054	0.231**	0.117	0.072	0.192*
	(0.069)	(0.187)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.176)	(0.082)
High Proposal x 2022 Vote Accuracy	0.119	−0.024	0.058	0.055	−0.067	0.000
	(0.086)	(0.158)	(0.120)	(0.082)	(0.156)	(0.109)
High Proposal	−0.103	0.073	−0.059	−0.045	0.103	0.004
	(0.077)	(0.152)	(0.101)	(0.073)	(0.148)	(0.091)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.000	−0.060	−0.017	−0.049	−0.058	−0.085
	(0.104)	(0.260)	(0.133)	(0.100)	(0.235)	(0.125)
Egotropic x High Proposal x 2022 Vote Accuracy	0.014	0.061	−0.016	0.066	0.064	0.044
	(0.117)	(0.270)	(0.160)	(0.113)	(0.247)	(0.152)
N	1395	732	501	1476	777	530
R^2	0.091	0.024	0.062	0.083	0.021	0.051

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-20: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Perception of Fraud in 2022 on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	0.009	−0.007	0.053	0.018	0.000	0.065
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.046)
2022 Voting Fraud	−0.179***	−0.033	−0.118*	−0.150***	0.062	−0.115*
	(0.034)	(0.073)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.068)	(0.055)
Egotropic x 2022 Voting Fraud	0.002	0.039	−0.044	−0.014	−0.016	−0.043
	(0.044)	(0.099)	(0.072)	(0.046)	(0.101)	(0.074)
High Proposal x 2022 Voting Fraud	−0.092	0.042	−0.078	−0.096	−0.004	−0.078
	(0.053)	(0.117)	(0.084)	(0.054)	(0.108)	(0.084)
High Proposal	0.040	0.047	0.026	0.042	0.045	0.042
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.050)
Egotropic x High Proposal	−0.011	−0.018	−0.026	−0.017	−0.015	−0.052
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.069)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.069)
Egotropic x High Proposal x 2022 Voting Fraud	0.037	0.094	−0.002	0.043	0.083	0.004
	(0.073)	(0.153)	(0.112)	(0.073)	(0.146)	(0.111)
N	1393	731	500	1474	776	529
R^2	0.116	0.024	0.089	0.094	0.021	0.082

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-21: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Perceptions of Systemic Voting Barriers on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.017	0.043	−0.053	0.004	0.049	−0.035
	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.049)
Perceptions of Barriers	0.076*	0.016	0.032	0.130***	0.083	0.035
	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Egotropic x Perceptions of Barriers	0.023	−0.067	0.122	−0.003	−0.068	0.105
	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.094)	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.105)
High Proposal x Perceptions of Barriers	0.197**	0.100	0.230*	0.108	0.042	0.163
	(0.067)	(0.097)	(0.113)	(0.069)	(0.099)	(0.120)
High Proposal	−0.093*	−0.016	−0.103	−0.052	−0.004	−0.062
	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.068)	(0.057)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.067	0.034	0.094	0.027	0.066	0.015
	(0.056)	(0.087)	(0.079)	(0.056)	(0.089)	(0.082)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Perceptions of Barriers	−0.095	−0.048	−0.242	−0.027	−0.075	−0.114
	(0.095)	(0.130)	(0.159)	(0.098)	(0.134)	(0.171)
N	1735	876	618	1900	957	672
R^2	0.04	0.016	0.031	0.039	0.016	0.026

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-22: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Perceptions of Systemic Voter Fraud on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.016	−0.020	−0.004	0.000	−0.013	0.029
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.060)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.060)
Perceptions of Fraud	−0.193***	−0.105	−0.112	−0.154***	−0.019	−0.113
	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.073)
Egotropic x Perceptions of Fraud	0.032	0.101	0.004	0.011	0.084	−0.031
	(0.050)	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.052)	(0.094)	(0.098)
High Proposal x Perceptions of Fraud	−0.164**	−0.059	−0.242*	−0.184**	−0.192	−0.267**
	(0.056)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.057)	(0.113)	(0.098)
High Proposal	0.068**	0.049	0.120*	0.074**	0.060*	0.149**
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.057)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.003	0.008	−0.062	−0.019	0.004	−0.153
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.088)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.086)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Perceptions of Fraud	0.067	0.020	0.118	0.097	0.095	0.222
	(0.075)	(0.152)	(0.137)	(0.076)	(0.152)	(0.136)
N	1719	865	617	1885	945	671
R^2	0.124	0.022	0.087	0.094	0.022	0.086

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-23: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Election Denialism on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	0.004	0.001	0.024	0.015	−0.005	0.098
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.069)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.065)
Election Denialism	−0.175***	−0.111*	−0.172***	−0.188***	−0.144**	−0.165***
	(0.023)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Egotropic x Election Denialism	−0.006	0.035	−0.024	−0.010	0.098	−0.109
	(0.033)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.034)	(0.080)	(0.076)
High Proposal x Election Denialism	−0.076	0.094	−0.070	−0.052	0.077	−0.082
	(0.039)	(0.098)	(0.078)	(0.039)	(0.095)	(0.076)
High Proposal	0.034	0.022	0.035	0.017	0.000	0.051
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.066)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.064)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.018	0.026	−0.039	0.017	0.048	−0.136
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.093)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.088)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Election Denialism	0.013	−0.059	0.032	0.002	−0.090	0.132
	(0.058)	(0.135)	(0.111)	(0.057)	(0.129)	(0.106)
N	1714	873	613	1878	957	667
R^2	0.145	0.022	0.09	0.14	0.022	0.108

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-24: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Political Interest on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.060	−0.076	−0.042	−0.040	−0.041	−0.049
	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Political Interest	0.034	0.061	−0.024	0.066	0.111*	−0.044
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Egotropic x Political Interest	0.077	0.109	0.066	0.060	0.066	0.097
	(0.048)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.048)	(0.074)	(0.077)
High Proposal x Political Interest	−0.008	0.146	−0.102	0.023	0.168*	−0.029
	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.082)
High Proposal	0.002	−0.068	0.060	−0.023	−0.101	0.025
	(0.042)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.061)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.061	0.077	−0.023	0.075	0.119	−0.014
	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.058)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Political Interest	−0.048	−0.095	0.011	−0.077	−0.136	−0.043
	(0.082)	(0.113)	(0.128)	(0.078)	(0.112)	(0.121)
N	1813	900	649	2000	987	713
R^2	0.01	0.066	0.013	0.016	0.079	0.009

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table D-25: Effects of Framing and Increased Spending by Political Knowledge on Perception of Election Administration Quality

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Egotropic	−0.036	0.009	−0.085	0.003	0.043	−0.045
	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.077)
Political Knowledge	−0.022	0.079	−0.189**	−0.022	0.061	−0.168**
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.057)
Egotropic x Political Knowledge	0.035	−0.011	0.111	−0.006	−0.051	0.078
	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.095)	(0.055)	(0.078)	(0.090)
High Proposal x Political Knowledge	−0.100	−0.043	−0.027	−0.063	0.021	−0.042
	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.060)	(0.087)	(0.091)
High Proposal	0.073	0.074	0.013	0.040	0.006	0.034
	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.049)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Egotropic x High Proposal	0.001	−0.037	0.004	−0.008	−0.011	−0.046
	(0.075)	(0.106)	(0.118)	(0.069)	(0.102)	(0.108)
Egotropic x High Proposal x Political Knowledge	0.036	0.055	−0.031	0.041	0.040	0.007
	(0.090)	(0.123)	(0.141)	(0.084)	(0.120)	(0.130)
N	1813	900	649	2000	987	713
R^2	0.009	0.019	0.05	0.006	0.014	0.049

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

E Moderators: Supporting Increased Election Funding Proposals

Table E-26: Effects of Increased Spending by Perception of Government Waste on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Gov. Waste	−0.745***	−0.536***	−0.650***	−0.737***	−0.536***	−0.641***
	(0.045)	(0.074)	(0.096)	(0.044)	(0.073)	(0.078)
High Proposal x Gov. Waste	0.036	−0.028	0.100	0.089	0.000	0.138
	(0.074)	(0.108)	(0.137)	(0.073)	(0.106)	(0.132)
High Proposal	−0.050	−0.004	−0.134	−0.096	−0.037	−0.158
	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.124)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.118)
N	1431	712	526	1578	785	577
R^2	0.233	0.151	0.149	0.214	0.141	0.156

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-27: Effects of Increased Spending by Perception of Government Benevolence on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Gov. Benevolence	0.729***	0.647***	0.477***	0.735***	0.620***	0.492***
	(0.044)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.072)
High Proposal x Gov. Benevolence	0.039	−0.056	0.063	0.018	−0.077	0.074
	(0.064)	(0.129)	(0.107)	(0.063)	(0.126)	(0.106)
High Proposal	−0.034	−0.002	−0.046	−0.026	0.004	−0.043
	(0.030)	(0.077)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.076)	(0.036)
N	1431	712	526	1578	785	577
R^2	0.244	0.12	0.15	0.232	0.109	0.159

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-28: Effects of Increased Spending by Participation in 2022 General Election on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Voted in 2022	0.000	0.082	−0.171**	−0.028	0.038	−0.169**
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.057)
High Proposal x Voted in 2022	−0.038	0.011	0.033	−0.023	0.036	0.010
	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.071)
High Proposal	0.003	−0.033	−0.075	−0.008	−0.060	−0.048
	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.066)
N	1431	712	526	1578	785	577
R^2	0.002	0.014	0.056	0.004	0.009	0.062

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-29: Effects of Increased Spending by 2022 Vote Mode on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Voted Early in 2022	−0.023	0.061	−0.027	−0.011	0.045	0.016
	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.053)
High Proposal x Voted Early in 2022	0.059	0.014	0.084	0.059	0.051	0.071
	(0.060)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Voted In-person in 2022	−0.025	0.072	0.006	−0.019	0.072	0.017
	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.045)
High Proposal x Voted In-person in 2022	−0.005	−0.029	−0.033	−0.014	−0.019	−0.052
	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.060)
High Proposal	−0.047	−0.017	−0.049	−0.042	−0.034	−0.030
	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.050)
N	1156	601	430	1240	646	460
R^2	0.006	0.01	0.018	0.007	0.013	0.023

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-30: Effects of Increased Spending by 2022 Voting Convenience on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
2022 Voting Convenience	0.173*	0.287**	−0.003	0.144*	0.289**	−0.099
	(0.071)	(0.110)	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.107)	(0.098)
High Proposal x 2022 Voting Convenience	−0.079	−0.022	−0.141	−0.065	−0.034	−0.093
	(0.114)	(0.158)	(0.170)	(0.108)	(0.152)	(0.157)
High Proposal	0.035	−0.004	0.086	0.027	0.005	0.045
	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.159)	(0.099)	(0.140)	(0.146)
N	1127	586	421	1192	625	442
R^2	0.008	0.027	0.011	0.006	0.026	0.016

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-31: Effects of Increased Spending by 2022 Vote Accuracy on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
2022 Vote Accuracy	0.414***	0.451**	0.111	0.425***	0.478***	0.109
	(0.053)	(0.148)	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.144)	(0.060)
High Proposal x 2022 Vote Accuracy	0.029	0.001	−0.018	−0.010	−0.082	−0.031
	(0.074)	(0.194)	(0.088)	(0.071)	(0.184)	(0.084)
High Proposal	−0.065	−0.029	−0.032	−0.026	0.046	−0.017
	(0.061)	(0.181)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.172)	(0.065)
N	1127	586	421	1192	625	442
R^2	0.089	0.049	0.018	0.086	0.047	0.015

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-32: Effects of Increased Spending by Perception of Fraud in 2022 on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
2022 Voting Fraud	−0.383***	−0.163	−0.198**	−0.347***	−0.069	−0.193**
	(0.036)	(0.105)	(0.061)	(0.037)	(0.094)	(0.061)
High Proposal x 2022 Voting Fraud	0.087	0.274*	0.067	0.059	0.164	0.048
	(0.053)	(0.136)	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.123)	(0.076)
High Proposal	−0.057*	−0.061	−0.082	−0.047	−0.051	−0.068
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.055)
N	1125	585	420	1190	624	441
R^2	0.133	0.013	0.054	0.115	0.006	0.052

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-33: Effects of Increased Spending by Perceptions of Systemic Voting Barriers on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Perceptions of Barriers	0.228***	0.001	0.233**	0.272***	0.046	0.262**
	(0.055)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.053)	(0.075)	(0.080)
High Proposal x Perceptions of Barriers	0.174*	0.205	−0.013	0.107	0.127	−0.036
	(0.075)	(0.112)	(0.109)	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.112)
High Proposal	−0.109**	−0.150*	−0.029	−0.073	−0.109	−0.006
	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.065)	(0.049)
N	1399	700	513	1542	772	561
R^2	0.059	0.014	0.039	0.059	0.012	0.04

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-34: Effects of Increased Spending by Perceptions of Systemic Voting Fraud on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Perceptions of Fraud	−0.415***	−0.236**	−0.213*	−0.360***	−0.120	−0.214*
	(0.043)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.084)
High Proposal x Perceptions of Fraud	−0.008	0.042	−0.064	−0.010	−0.026	−0.048
	(0.057)	(0.136)	(0.105)	(0.059)	(0.121)	(0.102)
High Proposal	−0.026	−0.046	−0.017	−0.024	−0.036	−0.014
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.071)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.068)
N	1393	697	511	1534	767	559
R^2	0.154	0.029	0.068	0.113	0.016	0.056

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-35: Effects of Increased Spending by Perceptions of Election Denialism on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Election Denialism	−0.382***	−0.209**	−0.325***	−0.388***	−0.190**	−0.334***
	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.030)	(0.061)	(0.065)
High Proposal x Election Denialism	0.002	−0.064	0.091	0.008	−0.062	0.079
	(0.045)	(0.110)	(0.084)	(0.044)	(0.102)	(0.083)
High Proposal	−0.035	−0.015	−0.133	−0.038	−0.021	−0.112
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.072)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.070)
N	1384	701	505	1524	774	553
R^2	0.205	0.037	0.1	0.201	0.034	0.107

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-36: Effects of Increased Spending by Political Interest on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Political Interest	0.188***	0.322***	0.005	0.227***	0.357***	0.026
	(0.048)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.046)	(0.070)	(0.074)
High Proposal x Political Interest	−0.146*	−0.039	−0.149	−0.161*	−0.128	−0.090
	(0.074)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.098)	(0.093)
High Proposal	0.075	−0.001	0.063	0.087	0.064	0.030
	(0.058)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.071)
N	1431	712	526	1578	785	577
R^2	0.016	0.062	0.018	0.022	0.061	0.006

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

Table E-37: Effects of Increased Spending by Political Knowledge on Support for Funding Proposals

	Attentive Respondents			All Respondents		
	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans	All Respondents	Democrats	Republicans
Political Knowledge	−0.025	0.138*	−0.269**	−0.062	0.071	−0.253**
	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.077)
High Proposal x Political Knowledge	−0.058	0.008	0.101	−0.023	0.040	0.078
	(0.074)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.066)	(0.089)	(0.095)
High Proposal	0.018	−0.031	−0.122	−0.008	−0.061	−0.091
	(0.062)	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.083)
N	1431	712	526	1578	785	577
R^2	0.004	0.019	0.06	0.005	0.011	0.054

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Models use HC2 robust standard errors.

F Statement Regarding the Ethical Use of Human Subjects

As with any study conducted with human subjects, great care was taken to allow for the ethical collection of data, particularly as it relates to political and personal responses or information that would otherwise be considered sensitive in nature. A respect for participants' privacy and need to be transparent with them about the tasks involved can be challenging when the research is public facing and entails the use of implicit, subtle interventions. Nevertheless, the experimental protocol was designed in such a way that reconciled and accommodated these considerations. First, respondents were immediately given both instructions and a description of study, including the types of questions that they would be asked. Further, individuals were provided with the names and contact information of the institution(s) and principal investigator(s), offering an opportunity to express any concerns or follow-up comments. Subjects were assured that they could end the survey at any point and that any information that may be personally identifying or revealing would be confidential. Since responsiveness to information about election administration were the phenomenon of interest, the data were generated using self-reported classifications. Collectively, these choices evince a clear commitment to the AAPOR's "Code of Professional Ethics and Practices."