Can official messaging on trust in elections break through partisan polarization?

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Abstract: Politicians and pundits have made trust in the administration of American elections an issue of political disagreement. Combining politicization with inflexible partisan polarization could undermine an essential condition of democracy: the peaceful transfer of power following elections. Can messaging about trust in elections break through partisan polarization? Partnering with election officials from Los Angeles County, Colorado, Georgia, and Texas, we used messaging experiments with nearly 8,500 Americans following the 2022 US midterm elections to measure the impact on trust in elections. We find that state and local election officials are particularly effective at increasing trust in their own state elections. Our pooled estimate suggests that one 30-second official advertisement increases trust in local elections by about one-fifth of the pre-treatment difference between Democrats and Republicans. Videos explaining protections on election integrity in Arizona and Virginia increase trust that our national sample reports in elections administered outside their own state. Our results suggest election officials can break through partisan politics and play an important role in rebuilding trust in the democratic process.

Keywords: Trust in elections; experiments; election administration; party polarization
Introduction

Party polarization has dramatically increased over recent decades. Many pundits and scholars argue that partisans in the American public hold strong, divided, and unmoving opinions about candidate choice and public policy. This view holds that party affiliation drives vote choice and that partisans selectively interpret political information favorable to their personal politics. Evidence in support of this view includes the large differences in presidential approval between those who identify with each party regardless of the nation’s economic performance (Sides, Tausanovitch, and Vavreck 2022) and the small effects of political advertising campaigns (Coppock, Hill, and Vavreck 2020, Sides, Vavreck, and Warshaw 2022). Polarized politics can lead to gridlock in governing (Binder 2014; Lee 2016; Patashnik and Schiller 2020; Drutman 2020; Klein 2020). It is closely linked to “affective polarization,” the gap between reported feelings toward in-and out-party others, which has now reached levels that stand out in America’s recent history (Iyengar et al. 2019) and relative to other nations (Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro 2021). Druckman et al. 2021 find that affective polarization shapes expressed policy positions of partisans regardless of personal preferences.

Perhaps most troubling is the threat that rigid partisan polarization might pose to American democracy. Clark and Stewart (2021) document a “historic gap in confidence” between Democrat and Republican trust in elections, which grew even larger after the 2020 election cycle.¹ Finkel et al. (2020) contend that political polarization in the United States has become elevated into political sectarianism, a “poisonous cocktail of othering, aversion, and moralization” that “poses a threat to democracy” (p. 533). If the partisan divide leads to hardened divisions over election integrity, where politicians convince citizens that electoral results are fraudulent unless their side wins – regardless of countervailing information – the threat to democracy is indeed serious.

While the view that Americans have rigidly polarized views might be widely accepted, a small but growing academic literature suggests that even though American public opinion is polarized, it is responsive to new information. Democrats and Republicans in the electorate may begin with largely divergent views on an issue, but as they encounter relevant facts or arguments, these views evolve in the same direction (e.g., Gerber and Green 1999; Hill 2017; Coppock 2022; Tapin et al. 2023). These findings are consistent with macro-level evidence on opinion shifts in recent decades, such as the change in views on same-sex marriage and marijuana legalization. While partisan gaps have endured on these issues, both Republicans and Democrats have dramatically shifted their views in the same direction (Pew Research Center 2019).

Is persuasion possible in the politicized and conflictual realm of trust in elections, or do identifiers of each party hold such rigid views that new information can have no effect? This is a crucial public policy issue not just because of the abstract principle of faith in democracy. Distrust in elections challenges the non-partisan administration of elections

¹ Throughout the text, when we refer to “Democrat,” “Republican,” or “Independent” citizens, we mean those who identify with that party label when queried in an opinion survey.
and even appears to have increased threats of physical violence against public servants (Barr 2022; Gronke and Manson 2022).

Following the 2020 presidential contest, election officials around the nation experienced firsthand the decline in shared trust of American elections. In response, many officials began recording and airing messages to explain and make transparent electoral procedures and administration. Messaging from these experts could be a promising avenue toward restoring voters’ trust in elections, but only if Americans of all parties are open to updating their views on election integrity after exposure to official messaging.

We test that proposition in this paper through a series of messaging experiments conducted after the November 2022 midterm election. Our experiments expose respondents to facts about how elections work using public information videos produced by state and local elections officials. Randomization allows us to estimate if and by how much these messages influence beliefs about the integrity of elections and trust in democratic procedures.

We find strong evidence that voters of all partisan leanings – Republicans, Democrats, and Independents alike – are responsive to official messaging. These treatments did not simply increase trust among those who already trusted elections; even Republicans, who currently have the lowest beliefs about electoral integrity, and respondents in a pre-survey who reported the lowest levels of trust prior to the messages, reported higher trust in elections after viewing the videos.

The treatment effects we observe are both significant and substantively large given the brevity of treatment. We find effects in all five survey experiments. Respondent reactions fit logical patterns: videos from officials in their own state increase trust in own state elections. Videos describing procedures to safeguard the vote in other states lead to more trust in the elections of other states. These patterns suggest reasoned uptake of the new information, and the effects appear among voters of all partisan affiliations.

Because Democrats, Independents, and Republicans report increased trust in elections in response to treatment messages, exposure does not materially diminish partisan gaps in trust. But the messages do increase reported trust by Americans of all partisan stripes, providing hopeful evidence both that public opinion can shift with new evidence and that faith in election integrity can be restored.

Our clearest contribution is to the burgeoning scientific literature on trust in elections, much of which seeks to identify solutions to the challenges posed by declining faith in democracy (Clayton and Willer 2023; Coppock et al. 2023, Voelkel et al. 2023). We show that the actual messages that have been produced by elections officials could, if amplified, bring meaningful increases in trust across party lines. Our results also support the growing

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2 The survey was put into the field immediately after control of the U.S. House had been called for the Republican Party by the Associated Press.
literature suggesting persuasion is possible even on political issues that divide the political parties (Hill 2017; Coppock 2022; Tapin et al. 2023).

The project also demonstrates the value of research-practice partnerships. We designed our surveys in partnership with election officials, using an experimental approach and preregistered hypotheses, to bring rigorous evidence to bear on this critical question. Since the 2020 contest, those working to restore faith in the integrity of elections have been trying innovative approaches (Voelkel et al. 2023) and spreading best practices (Fessler 2022). Our study is designed to provide an analytical basis to evaluate these best practices, conducting tests that can show whether messages work, which messages are most effective, and what types of Americans are most responsive to them.

We first briefly review existing work on both persuasion and the effectiveness of government interventions and the literature regarding trust in elections. Next, we describe our research design, our partnership with elected officials, our survey methodology, the videos we used as treatments for our survey experiments, and our pre-registered hypotheses. We then present our results before concluding with a discussion of the implications of our findings and ideas for future research.

### Partisan Polarization and Trust in Elections

Trust in American elections has become increasingly polarized in recent years with mistrust reaching new highs. Clark and Stewart (2021) document a “historic gap in confidence” between Democrat and Republican trust in elections, which grew even larger after the 2020 election cycle. Significant research effort has gone into documenting the source of mistrust and misinformation in the electorate. Personality differences and differences in perception styles have been linked to higher levels of mistrust in America as well as belief in election fraud (Edelson et al. 2017, Norris et al. 2019, Calvillo et al. 2021).

Additionally, evidence suggests that political elites have played a role in increasing mistrust by repeating unsubstantiated claims about voter fraud in messaging directed at their supporters (Beaulieu 2014, Berlinski et al. 2021). Reller et al. (2022) show that trust in elections can respond to non-partisan cues, finding that the partisans of the party who lose an election express reduced trust following the loss. Notably, election winners also saw an increase in trust. Evidence suggests then that trust in elections is eroded by a wide range of causes but that it can also be increased.

What are the prospects for increasing trust among the electorate? If citizens purely engage in motivated reasoning, the way that they process new information will be biased in the direction of positions that they already hold (Lodge and Taber 2013). With Republicans and Independents significantly less trusting of elections than Democrats after the 2020 cycle, they might be resistant to information affirming integrity of elections. This could make it difficult to persuade these voters that elections are generally safe. Experiments testing messages from political leaders during this period provide mixed evidence. One study found
that Republicans become more trusting in elections when exposed to messages from election leaders affirming the legitimacy of the 2020 result (Clayton and Willer 2023). However, another found no impact of messages from Mitch McConnell and Arnold Schwarzenegger on election trust, even though we might expect such Republican leaders to be trusted sources on this issue (Wuttke et al. 2023).

Prior work testing corrections of misperceptions about elections even finds that messages can backfire among Republicans (Holman and Lay 2018; Christenson et al. 2021) or that their corrective effect among Republicans disappeared after the 2020 election (Jenkins and Gomez 2020). This is consistent with Lockhart et al.'s (2020) finding that while Democrats and Independents revised their views of how elections should be conducted based on scientific projections about the Covid epidemic during the 2020 election cycle, Republicans did not change their views when exposed to this information. Thus evidence suggests that Republicans might be more difficult to persuade on issues where they are already polarized.

By contrast, others find that while the two parties may begin with very different views, their members are open to learning and revising beliefs (Gerber and Green 1999; Hill 2017; Coppock 2022; Tapin et al. 2023). One strand of this literature draws on recent experimental evidence to show that voters of all political persuasions consider new information and update their beliefs to become closer to the new information they encounter (Coppock 2022). This literature suggests that backfire effects might be rare.

Additional work has looked at what types of messaging or cues might increase trust directly. Coppock et al. (2022) find that correcting misinformation is effective at changing beliefs but does little to change overall attitudes; voters can be corrected, but this does not increase their trust in elections. Voelkel et al. (2023) test a wide range of messaging strategies aimed at reducing support for undemocratic practices ranging from information provision to empathy-taking interventions. They find that many interventions are effective at reducing this support, but unfortunately do not look at questions of trust in current election procedures. These studies provide some basis for expecting interventions on trust to be effective, but do not directly test these outcomes.

Existing research studies the effect of messages from politicians or academics. Who do people look to on issues of voting and elections? Our survey reveals that election officials are the most trusted information source. In our national sample of Americans, when we asked “Who do you trust when it comes to evaluating the fairness and integrity of elections? (Check all that apply),” 50.4% of respondents selected “Local and state elections officials.” This was higher than any other source: “Television news in my local area (28.6%),” “Fox News (22.8%),” “CNN (22.0%)”, and “Political leaders in my party (17.3%).” Voters say that they trust information from election officials more than from political leaders or the news media.

Previous research shows government messaging campaigns can be effective at changing opinions and behavior. In the realm of public health, multiple meta-analyses show that government campaigns can produce positive shifts in behavior. A meta-analysis of 63
public health intervention campaigns and finds that government messaging can change behavior (Anker et al. 2016) Similarly, Snyder (2006) finds a roughly 5 percentage point impact of health interventions. Research on political messaging has shown that election officials can play a role in shaping voting behavior within their jurisdictions (Kimball et al. 2006).  

Election officials have begun to undertake these types of campaigns to increase trust in elections and reduce misinformation; for example, in Wisconsin the League of Wisconsin Municipalities partners with other local government groups to run a campaign in advance of the April 2022 local elections in the state (Associated Press 2022). Given that election officials are using these campaigns and voters report to trust them, our study aims to understand if messaging from election officials can break through polarized attitudes about election integrity.

**Research Design**

_Election Official Partnership_

We partnered with election officials in the United States to test messaging strategies already employed by states and counties to increase trust in elections. Our subnational treatments were chosen in consultation with these partners in Los Angeles County, Colorado, Texas, and Georgia. These partners, in addition to choosing the treatments, suggested and informed our choice of questions and outcome measures.

_Messaging Content_

In total, we tested ten different videos with information and messaging produced by state or county election officials aimed at increasing trust in elections. We summarize each video in Table 1 below. For example, one video was a clip of a Fox News interview with the Texas Secretary of State discussing Texas election procedures and integrity. One video from Georgia simply presented information about how to vote in person and what to expect. We did not have _a priori_ expectations about which messages would be most effective.

Respondents assigned to control conditions viewed a 30-second State Farm Insurance advertisement in our national experiment or a 30-second Cadillac car advertisement in our subnational experiments.
Table 1. Description of video treatments for each sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Video Treatment 1</th>
<th>Video Treatment 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>The “Democracy Defended” ad from Virginia, which introduces elections clerks from all across the state in order to put a human face on those protecting the vote.</td>
<td>A video from Maricopa County in Arizona, providing an in-depth description of the procedures and practices that safeguard election integrity there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>A video produced by the former and current Colorado Secretaries of State – one a Democrat and one a Republican – explaining that the election was administered in a non-partisan way.</td>
<td>A video produced by the Denver elections office that had no partisan features and instead provided information on a risk limiting audit that took place in Denver to ensure the integrity of election results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>A video produced by the Georgia elections office that explained how to vote in person and what to expect on election day.</td>
<td>A video produced by the Georgia elections office that explained how to vote by absentee ballot in advance of election day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA County</td>
<td>A video featuring County Registrar Recorder Dean C. Logan about where to find official election information and trusted information sources.</td>
<td>A video produced by our research team that featured still images produced by the LA County Registrar-Recorder’s office presented sequentially in video form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>A video of then-Secretary of State John B. Scott explaining how voting systems in Texas work produced by the Secretary of State’s office</td>
<td>An interview on FOX between Texas Secretary of State Scott and FOX News host Eric Shawn. The interview featured the host describing evidence that there was little election fraud in 2020 followed by Scott explaining measures Texas was taking to keep its elections safe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey Methodology

We conducted five surveys from November 17-27, 2022, immediately following the Associated Press calling the results of the 2022 midterm elections in the US House of Representatives for the Republican party. This timing meant that election integrity was near its highest salience due to substantial media coverage along with messaging from candidates on the subject. Each survey was administered through Cint (formerly Luc.id) using quota sampling to produce representative results. Cint has been used frequently by researchers studying American elections and has been shown to produce treatment results that are close to those produced using other samples (Coppock and McClellan 2019).

In total, we collected responses from 8,338 participants. We list the full text of the election survey questions and answers in our appendix and provide the data and code
necessary to replicate our findings at [DATaverse LINK TO COME]. Our survey instrument and methodology were reviewed and certified as exempt from IRB review by the UC San Diego Human Research Protections Program.

One survey targeted a national sample (N=3,038) while the other four targeted representative samples in Colorado, Georgia, Texas, and Los Angeles County with samples of around 1,500 respondents. We targeted quotas based on the citizen voting age population in each state or county and respondents could elect to take the survey in either English or Spanish.

We employed two attention checks drawn from Berinsky et al. (2019) and terminated (in real-time) respondents who failed either check. However, we subsequently identified a set of responses that, while passing the two checks, appear to have been generated by automated computer programs (“bots”). We first identified the problem when we noticed an unusually large number of “respondents” who selected a response to one question indicating that electoral fraud happens “all the time” yet selected a response to a different question indicating they trust elections “a lot” or “some” (the strongest options available). We document in the appendix our procedure to identify and remove suspected bot respondents based on incoherent yet repeated open-end text responses.

Our subnational geographies reflect significant racial, ethnic, and political diversity. The overall, combined national and state sample identified as 67% White, 12% Black, 16% Hispanic, and 4% Asian. Respondents are politically diverse; 45% report voting for Democratic candidate Joe Biden in the 2020 Presidential election while 36% report voting for Republican Donald Trump. 75% report having voted in the 2022 midterm elections.

Respondents in the survey were first asked about their overall trust in elections, their trust in specific features of the 2022 midterm elections, and their experience voting. Following this pre-treatment battery, respondents from the subnational samples were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: one of the two geography-specific official messages (see Table 1 above), or a control condition viewing a car commercial. Respondents to the national sample did not receive subnational messaging or control videos. We then asked subnational respondents to report a feature of the video to assess compliance with video assignment. On average, 91% accurately reported the feature they were asked about, suggesting most respondents did view the treatments.

All respondents – in national or subnational samples – were then randomly assigned to one of three national experiment conditions. A control condition presented the State Farm Insurance advertisement or the treatment condition assigned either the Virginia or Maricopa County video (Table 1). After viewing the national video, respondents were again asked questions they could not answer without having watched their assigned video; 87% did so successfully.

Finally, respondents were asked four general questions about their trust in elections, as well as whether they intended to vote in the 2024 Presidential election. The post-treatment questions were as follows:
1. How much do you trust the accuracy and integrity of elections in your state?
2. How much do you trust the accuracy and integrity of elections in other states?
3. It is illegal to vote more than once in an election or to vote if not a U.S. citizen. How frequently do you think such vote fraud occurs? Please provide your best guess even if you are not sure.
4. Do you think that official state or county election authorities – such as your Secretary of State, registrar, or elections director – ever engage in any form of vote fraud?

Expectations of Experimental Effects

We pre-registered five hypotheses related to election integrity in advance, each corresponding to a specific survey question. First, we expect videos that target trust in elections to increase overall trust in elections. However, trust in one’s own state and in other states could be distinct; a respondent might view a video from their own Secretary of State and become more trusting in elections in their own state without changing how they judge elections in different states. On the other hand, receiving any information from election officials about election integrity might increase trust in all American elections. Our two pre-registered hypotheses relating to general trust in elections were:

**H1:** Watching any government-produced video about the integrity of elections will increase a respondent’s trust in elections in their state.

**H2:** Watching any government-produced video about the integrity of elections will increase a respondent’s trust in elections in other states.

We also asked about specific forms of trust; if our treatments impact trust, is it trust that other voters act with electoral integrity or trust that election officials act with integrity? We asked about voter fraud by voters who are ineligible to vote or vote more than once, and we asked about fraud by election officials. Our third and fourth hypotheses were:

**H3:** Watching any government-produced video about the integrity of elections will increase a respondent’s doubt that there is illegal voting occurring in elections.

**H4:** Watching any government-produced video about the integrity of elections will increase a respondent’s doubt that there is fraud committed by election officials.

Finally, following conversations with our election official partners, we expected our treatments to potentially increase intention to vote in 2024. This is because officials believe that concerns about election integrity are the cause of some abstention from participation. Our fifth pre-registered hypothesis was:

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3 Our pre-registration was posted on EGAP on November 2nd, prior to the Midterm elections. It can be found at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/9RJK4.
**H5:** Watching any government-produced video about the integrity of elections will increase a respondent’s intent to vote in 2024.

**Pre-registered Analysis Plan**

For hypotheses 1 and 2, we asked respondents how much they trust in elections (a) in their own state and (b) in other states. These questions had four response categories ranging from “Distrust a lot” (coded 1) to “Trust a lot” (coded 4). For hypotheses 3 and 4, we asked respondents how commonly fraud by voters and fraud by officials occurs. The five response categories to these questions ranged from fraud “happens all the time” (1) to fraud “almost never occurs” (5). Finally, we measured vote intent for hypothesis 5 with a five-point scale that ranged from “Definitely will not vote” (1) to “Definitely will vote” (5). The full text of all questions is given in the appendix and in every case a higher value indicates more trust in elections or greater intention to participate.

We created within-subject change in attitudes by subtracting pre-treatment answers from post-treatment answers. This approach allows us to measure the effect of our treatments more precisely as it removes variation from the outcome variable that is due to pre-treatment differences across participants. We model our results using ordinary least squares. Because we subtract pre-treatment values of our outcome variables and our treatment is randomized, we do not include any additional control variables in our models.

For the main results, we combine the two treatment groups (different messaging videos). This follows our pre-registration because we did not have strong theoretical arguments for why one message should be more effective than the other, especially at the state and local levels where treatments were chosen in part by our election official partners. We did, however, pre-register a comparison of the two national treatment videos, with results presented below.

**Results**

**Patterns of Trust in Elections**

In Figure 1, we plot average levels of trust in elections reported by our respondents. The top frame presents average trust for elections in the respondent’s own state, the bottom for other states. Our sample reproduces the polarization in trust found by others. Those who identify as Democrat report average trust in their own state elections around 3.5 on the 4-point scale (halfway between “Trust some” and “Trust a lot”) across geographies. Those who identify as Republican report average trust in their own state elections of around 2.75, between “Distrust some” and “Trust some.” Independents report trust similar to that of Republicans.
Patterns of trust are similar across party identification for other state elections, with average trust modestly lower. Democrat averages are closer to “Trust some” for other states while Independent and Republican averages are now pushing closer to “Distrust some” than to “Trust some.”

Overall, these patterns establish the challenge facing American democracy. Americans express some unease about the operation of their elections, particularly elections held outside their own state. We next present evidence that messaging from election officials can improve these views.
**Experiment Results**

Table 2 reports the results of the national experiment on trust in elections comparing changes in trust in response to receiving one of the two election official messages versus change in response to receiving the insurance advertisement.\(^4\)

We see three important results in this table. First, national treatments significantly increased trust in elections: respondents were more likely to trust elections in other states, believed voter fraud was less common and believed fraud by officials was less common after viewing either treatment video. This is a promising result for those who aim to increase trust in elections: exposure to a short video produced by election officials can move opinions on a contentious, polarized topic. While views on election fraud might be expected to be relatively crystalized by mid-November 2022, these messages significantly shifted voters’ views even at a time of heightened polarization.

Additionally, we also find evidence that national messaging influences beliefs about elections in other states: the point estimate of treatment on trust in own state elections is one sixth that of trust in other state elections and not statistically significant from zero. However, despite the hopes of our partners, advertisements that build trust in elections do not increase reported intention to vote in future elections.

**Table 2. Binary results of the experiment in the pooled, national sample, following the pre-registration plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud Belief</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.047**</td>
<td>0.044*</td>
<td>0.083***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7816</td>
<td>7346</td>
<td>8319</td>
<td>8316</td>
<td>8322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(+ \ p < 0.1, \ * \ p < 0.05, \ ** \ p < 0.01, \ *** \ p < 0.001\)

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\(4\) The different sample sizes in each column are due to respondents not providing answers to the outcome questions; for the two trust questions, there was an explicit non-response option resulting in the slightly higher missingness.
Subnational Results

In Appendix Section 3, we present estimated treatment effects from each subnational sample in tables similar to Table 1. We summarize the subnational effects in Figure 2. Each bar corresponds to the treatment effect in that state for that dependent variable with whiskers extending to 80 percent confidence intervals. For example, the bar to the farthest left shows that the treatment effect of either Colorado video on respondent trust in Colorado elections is 0.093 points on the four-point scale. For each outcome variable, we also estimate a pooled treatment effect by combining the four samples and treating the design as a block-randomized experiment.

In each sample and in combination, we find positive and often strong effects of election official messaging on trust in respondents’ own state elections. The average effect of treatment videos pooling all subnational respondents on trust in own state elections is 0.12 points on the four-point scale. This estimate is about 20% of the pre-treatment difference in trust of own state elections between Democrats and Republicans in our national sample (see Figure 1). Effects vary from 0.07 in Los Angeles County to 0.21 in Texas. The results are consistent across the four geographies and suggest that official messaging increases trust in local elections.

Figure 2. Pooled treatment effects in each state and county subsample. Whiskers extend to 80% confidence intervals.

We find smaller and uncertain impacts of local election official messaging on trust in elections in other states. While all coefficient estimates are positive, they are always smaller than the effect on trust in own state elections. The pooled estimate is 0.042 points with a standard error of 0.019 (significant at p<.05).

We find similar patterns for reported beliefs about incidence of election fraud by both voters and officials: point estimates are consistently positive (suggesting messaging counteracts beliefs about fraud) though variable. The pooled estimates are 0.066 (SE = 0.024) voter fraud and 0.083 (SE = 0.024) official fraud.
We finally consider the effect of messages on intention to vote in 2024. The pooled estimate is 0.006 (SE = 0.015). Along with the small coefficients and variability across subnational samples, our evidence suggests that official messaging on integrity of electoral processes does not consistently or materially increase intention to vote.

Additional Analyses

In addition to the main effects of being exposed to a video on trust in elections, we pre-registered three additional analyses: looking at differences in the treatment effects of the two national level treatments and looking at subgroup effects among respondents we term persuadable and among respondents who appeared attentive.

First, we look at the difference in the treatment effects for the two national sample messaging videos. The video produced in Virginia we describe as an emotion-based treatment; it appeals to American identity and emotions but provides little information about the voting process or election administration. The video produced in Maricopa County, however, provides specific information about the processes used to ensure the integrity of the vote. Because these videos have substantially different messaging strategies, we look at whether there is a detectable difference between the two effects. This analysis was pre-registered as we anticipated the different treatment approaches to have different effects.

In Table 3, we find only suggestive evidence that the more factual video had a larger effect on respondent beliefs about the incidence of voter or election official fraud. The estimated treatment effect of the fact-focused message is 0.64 and on official fraud is 0.1 compared to 0.024 and 0.064 for the emotion-focused message (both differences statistically significant at p<0.1). We see negligible differences between point estimates on the remaining outcome. Thus, it appears the fact-focused message has a greater influence on beliefs about fraud than the emotions-focused message but does not have a greater influence on trust or vote intention.

Table 3. Categorical results of the experiment in the pooled, national sample, following pre-registration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud Belief</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td>0.011 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.048** (0.018)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.064** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facts</td>
<td>0.006 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.046** (0.018)</td>
<td>0.064** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.102*** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7816</td>
<td>7346</td>
<td>8319</td>
<td>8316</td>
<td>8322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In Appendix C we report results from two additional pre-registered subgroup analyses. First, we examine respondents who identified as attentive based on their behavior in the survey. Following our pre-registration plan, we categorized respondents as attentive if they accurately reported the feature of the video they were assigned to watch and spent at least 20 seconds viewing the page with the treatment video embedded. The results, presented in Table C1, are both substantively and statistically the same as those presented in Table 2.

The second additional analysis that was pre-registered looked at respondents who we anticipated to be more persuadable: those with pre-existing moderate views on election trust. Respondents who responded that they “trust elections a lot” or “distrust elections a lot” consistently to our four pre-treatment election trust questions we pre-registered as ex ante less persuadable. These respondents were the most polarized on the topic and likely had been exposed to the highest level of information prior to our intervention. Additionally, they could only be persuaded in one direction; low trust respondents could only gain trust and high trust respondents could only lose it. The results presented in Table C2 for persuadable respondents, however, are substantively and statistically the same as those presented in Table 2, suggesting against heterogeneous opportunity for persuasion.

Results by respondent party identification

Our main conclusion is that official messaging about election procedures can increase trust in elections and decrease beliefs about election fraud. This shows that official messages can break through partisan polarization. The effects presented above are averaged across all respondents regardless of whether they identify with a political party or, if so, with which party. To confirm that these messages break through political polarization, in this section we estimate effects by the party identification of the respondents. While not pre-registered, we anticipate many readers will want to see these results to feel comfortable concluding the messages break through polarization.

In Table 4 we present the treatment effect of the national videos interacted with respondent party identification. The results show that there is no significant difference between partisans. In fact, across the five specifications the coefficient for Republicans is larger than the coefficient for Democrats in four cases and functionally identical in the fifth. Independents also generally exhibit higher but statistically indistinguishable effects than Democrats. This provides strong evidence that the messages tested break through polarization; voters respond to messages from election officials.
Table 4. Heterogeneous treatment effects by party. Democratic respondents are the excluded category such that interaction effects represent deviations from the effects on Democrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust State</th>
<th>Own Trust States</th>
<th>Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud Belief</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.050*</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.070*</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.066*</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.079*</td>
<td>0.080*</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated X Independent</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated X Republican</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7816</td>
<td>7346</td>
<td>8319</td>
<td>8316</td>
<td>8322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Conclusion

In our messaging experiments conducted with samples representative of the full United States or of subnational geographies Los Angeles County, Colorado, Georgia, and Texas, we find strong evidence that messages produced and delivered by election officials can increase trust in the integrity of American elections. Vitally, these treatment effects do not vary by party: Republicans, Democrats, and Independents alike respond by increasing their confidence when exposed to information about election protections. These effects are substantively important and statistically significant.

Our findings contribute to the set of recent works exploring innovative ways to increase trust in elections (Clayton and Willer 2023; Coppock et al. 2023; Voelkel et al. 2023). They also speak to the broader literature on whether partisanship prevents opinion change during this polarized era. Work on motivated reasoning and affective polarization point to
the challenges of breaking through partisan polarization with new information. Some studies find this to be true in the realm of trust in elections, finding either that Republicans are unmoving (Wuttke et al. 2022) or that correcting election-related misperceptions can backfire with GOP supporters (Holman and Lay 2018; Christenson et al. 2021; Jenkins and Gomez 2022). By contrast, our findings are in keeping with studies demonstrating that political views can evolve together across party lines (Gerber and Green 1999; Hill 2017; Coppock 2022; Tapin et al. 2023).

These results provide evidence that public information campaigns can be effective at restoring trust in American elections. Although the magnitudes that we observe are not in themselves large enough to overcome the deficits in trust evident for some groups in our survey, these effects follow viewing a single short video. We find these effects despite public positions taken by prominent politicians over the past two years that might have solidified views on election integrity. Perhaps a more lengthy and intensive campaign consisting of factual videos addressing different types of election integrity concerns could be more impactful and could meaningfully restore faith in the administration of elections.

Future research could explore the causal mechanisms that underpin the increases in trust that we observe. One area that needs further clarification is whether different types of messages – for instance, those that deliver factual content versus those that prime emotions – are differentially effective. Another question is whether the information contained in these messages affects trust through increasing factual knowledge, with only the respondents who become more knowledgeable about elections shifting their level of trust. Alternatively, do respondents simply become more likely to trust elections when they are exposed to a list of the precautions in place to protect them, increasing their general level of confidence even if they do not absorb the specific details of these protections? Finally, to address the potentially disparate effects of messaging by race, ethnicity, or age, future work could look to identify causal mechanisms that generate heterogeneity in response to the official messaging.

Regardless of the mechanism, our set of experiments demonstrates the significant impact that information delivered by election officials can have on Americans of all party affiliations. As the 2024 presidential contest approaches, a robust public information campaign could play a significant role in restoring faith in American elections and potentially reducing the persistent partisan gap in trust that has only grown in the wake of the 2022 midterm.

Our findings suggest an important place for state and local election officials in combating misinformation and distrust in elections in the United States. In our national survey, we find that these officials are far and away the most trusted source of information on election integrity. More than 50% of respondents identify election officials as their most trusted source for “evaluating the fairness and integrity of elections,” compared with 17% who turn to party political leaders. This descriptive result reinforces our experimental result, that election official messages can move the needle on trust.

Another finding from our national survey has an implication for how a public information campaign could be most effective. Overall, 72% of those surveyed trust...
elections in their own states “some” or “a lot.” By contrast, 58% trust the accuracy and integrity of elections in other states. This gap, with Americans trusting election in their own states much more than they trust elections in other states, is consistent across party lines. The implication is that we cannot only rely on the existing efforts of state and county election officials with messages targeting their electorates about the elections in their own states. These local efforts need to be supplemented by a cross-state or national efforts designed to explain the safeguards on elections in other states, especially the battleground states most likely to be the focus of future controversy. Our national experiment shows that such effects can be effective in building a shared national trust in elections.
References


Beaulieu, Emily. 2014. “From voter ID to party ID: How political parties affect perceptions of election fraud in the U.S.” Electoral Studies 35: pp 24-32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.03.003


Coppock, Alexander, Kimberly Gross, Ethan Porter, Emily Thorson, and Thomas J. Wood. 2023. "Conceptual Replication of Four Key Findings about Factual Corrections and


Appendix A – Removal of automated responses

The concern over automated responses to our surveys stems from odd behavior in response to the open-ended questions that were asked on the surveys. We identified 3 types of odd responses that occurred significantly more frequently than would be expected from either inattentive respondents or chance. First, in our sample of Georgians we noticed over 200 respondents who answered every open-ended question “OK EM”. Second, in the Los Angeles sample a suspicious number of responses responded only “1” to open-ended questions. Finally, across the LA, Colorado, and Texas samples we noticed submitted responses that were simply substrings of the question being asked. For example, when the question read "Would you like to share with us another aspect of elections that you do not trust?", responses might read “nother aspect of elec”. These patterns are summarized in Table A1.

Table A1. Summary of suspicious open-ended responses by state sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Bot-responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Substring of question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>OK EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substring of question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Substring of question</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We then confirmed this suspicious behavior in two ways. First, the automated responses give consistent answers to demographic questions. This is particularly evident when looking at respondent ages as the automated responses cluster on a small number of specific ages. Figure A1 plots reported age as a histogram. It is evident that a few ages are represented much more than would be expected.

Figure A1. Histograms showing the age distribution of the subnational samples using single year bins.
Finally, we look at patterns of responses that we considered unexpected among these users with odd open-ended responses and clustered ages. For example, we compare responses about trust in elections between suspected bots to the remainder of the sample. In Table A2, we split respondents into high and low general levels of trust in elections and compare how they respond to questions of trust in election officials. Respondents with high trust in elections should also consider fraud by election officials to be uncommon if they are responding coherently. We find that among non-suspect respondents, this holds true. Those who report high trust in elections are more than six times more likely to state that fraud by officials almost never occurs, while those who report low trust are almost twice as likely to report fraud happens all the time.

However, among suspected bots, 94% of those who report high trust in elections also report that fraud by election officials happens all the time, four times the rate of suspected bots reporting low trust in elections. These response patterns are incoherent Table A3 repeats this for belief in voter fraud; again it is clear the identifies automatically generated respondents do not behave the same as real respondents.
Table A2. Comparison of high and low trust respondents within each type of respondent on their beliefs in vote fraud.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Suspect respondents</th>
<th>Remaining respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Trust</td>
<td>Low Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud by official state or county election authorities almost never occurs</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud by official state or county election authorities occurs infrequently</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud by official state or county election authorities occurs about half of the time</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud by official state or county election authorities is very common</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud by official state or county election authorities happens all of the time</td>
<td>94.45%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3. Comparison of high and low trust respondents within each type of respondent on their beliefs in vote fraud.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Suspect respondents</th>
<th>Remaining respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Trust</td>
<td>Low Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote fraud almost never occurs</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote fraud occurs infrequently</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote fraud occurs about half of the time</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote fraud is very common</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote fraud happens all of the time</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We take this as clear evidence that these respondents are not just disengaged or lazy, but rather following a set procedure that produces logically incoherent results.

In the end, we remove the respondents we suspect of being automatically generated from our data and re-weight the analysis to match population levels within states when appropriate. We drop all respondents whose response to the open-ended question “Would you like to share with us another aspect of elections that you do not trust?” meets the criteria presented in Table A1.
Appendix B – Full state and county results

Table B1. Binary results of the experiment in Colorado, following the pre-registration plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud Belief</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td>1379</td>
<td>1378</td>
<td>1379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B2. Binary results of the experiment in Georgia, following the pre-registration plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud Belief</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.109**</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>1222</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>1223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table B3. Binary results of the experiment in Los Angeles, following the pre-registration plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.068*</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.092+</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>1229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B4. Binary results of the experiment in Texas, following the pre-registration plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.213***</td>
<td>0.073+</td>
<td>0.100*</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1376</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>1466</td>
<td>1467</td>
<td>1467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B5. Binary results of the experiment across all state and county samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.123***</td>
<td>0.042*</td>
<td>0.066**</td>
<td>0.083***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5002</td>
<td>4679</td>
<td>5294</td>
<td>5296</td>
<td>5298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Appendix C - Additional results from pre-registration

Below we represent additional results based on the two pre-registered subgroup analyses. These results do not differ from the main results, but we report them for transparency's sake.

Table C1. Results from identical specifications to the main table but subset to respondents who were attentive (viewed videos for a minimum of 20 seconds and got the manipulation checks right).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud Belief</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
<td>0.043*</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6318</td>
<td>5919</td>
<td>6686</td>
<td>6683</td>
<td>6686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table C2. Results from identical specifications to the main table but subset to respondents who were persuadable (neither completely trusted elections nor completely distrusted them).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Own State</th>
<th>Trust Other States</th>
<th>Vote Fraud Belief</th>
<th>Officials Fraud Belief</th>
<th>2024 Vote Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>0.090***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6981</td>
<td>6515</td>
<td>7471</td>
<td>7468</td>
<td>7474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Appendix D - Full survey questionnaire

The survey was available to respondents in both English and Spanish.

Generally speaking, how much do you trust the United States’ election system?
- Trust a lot
- Trust some
- Distrust some
- Distrust a lot
- Don't know/no opinion

Do you trust that the results from this year’s November election accurately reflect the vote, or do you think there is significant vote fraud in this election?
- I trust that the November election results accurately reflect the vote
- I think there is significant vote fraud in this election
- Don't know

How much do you trust the accuracy and integrity of elections in your state?
- Trust a lot
- Trust some
- Distrust some
- Distrust a lot
- Don't know/no opinion

How much do you trust the accuracy and integrity of elections in other states?
- Trust a lot
- Trust some
- Distrust some
- Distrust a lot
- Don't know/no opinion

Which method gives you the most confidence in the integrity and accuracy of the election?
- Voting by mail
- Voting by dropbox
- Voting in person

Rate your level of trust in the following features of elections:
- Accuracy in the counting of paper ballots cast in person
- Accuracy in the counting of ballots cast through electronic voting machines
- Accuracy in the counting of ballots cast by mail
- Ensuring that ineligible voters are prevented from casting ballots
- Ensuring that voters are prevented from casting more than one ballot
- Ensuring that eligible voters do not face obstacles to registering and casting their ballots
- The length of time required to count ballots

Would you like to share with us another aspect of elections that you do not trust? _______

It is illegal to vote more than once in an election or to vote if not a U.S. citizen. How frequently do you think such vote fraud occurs? Please provide your best guess even if you are not sure.
Vote fraud happens all of the time
Vote fraud is very common
Vote fraud occurs about half of the time
Vote fraud occurs infrequently
Vote fraud almost never occurs

Do you think that official state or county election authorities – such as your Secretary of State, registrar, or elections director – ever engage in any form of vote fraud?
Fraud by official state or county election authorities happens all of the time
Fraud by official state or county election authorities is very common
Fraud by official state or county election authorities occurs about half of the time
Fraud by official state or county election authorities occurs infrequently
Fraud by official state or county election authorities almost never occurs

Who do you trust when it comes to evaluating the fairness and integrity of elections? (Check all that apply)
Local and state elections officials
Television news in my local area
Fox News
CNN
Political leaders in my party

World War I came after World War II
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

Did you vote in this year’s November election that was recently held?
Yes, I voted in this election
No, I did not vote in this election

In this year’s November election, in what way did you cast your ballot?
By voting at your assigned polling place or vote center on election day
By filling out your vote-by-mail ballot and mailing it
By dropping your vote-by-mail ballot at a polling place or vote center on Election Day
By voting at a staffed county elections location before Election Day
By dropping your vote-by-mail ballot in an unstaffed secure county ballot drop box

How satisfied were you with the process of casting your ballot – whether it was through the mail, at a traditional polling place, or at a vote center – in this year’s November election?
Very satisfied
Somewhat satisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied

What aspect of the process of casting your ballot did not satisfy you? Select all that apply.
Hours available for in-person voting
Accessibility of in-person voting location
Assistance of election workers
Lack of voting materials in preferred languages
Ease or difficulty of using electronic voting machines
Locating in-person voting location address
Ease or difficulty of voting by mail
Lack of voting information or materials
Not confident ballot will be counted correctly
A long line at the location where I voted
Other:

If you voted in person at a polling place or vote center, how many minutes did you stand in line before you had the opportunity to cast your ballot?
Minutes spent in line: _____
Select this option if you cast a mail ballot

Approximately how many minutes did you travel to either vote in person or drop off your ballot?
Minutes spent traveling: _____
Select this option if you cast a mail ballot

How confident are you that your vote will be counted accurately this election?
Very confident
Somewhat confident
Don't know/unsure
Somewhat skeptical
Very skeptical

How confident are you that other people’s votes will be counted accurately in this election?
Very confident
Somewhat confident
Don't know/unsure
Somewhat skeptical
Very skeptical

Thinking ahead to future elections, if your state allows this method of voting, what would give you the most confidence that your ballot would be counted correctly?
By voting at a traditional polling place on Election Day
By mailing in your ballot, after that ballot was automatically sent to you a month before Election Day
By voting at a professionally staffed county vote center, either on or in the week or so before Election Day
By dropping your ballot at a vote center or at a secure county ballot drop box, after that ballot was automatically sent to you a month before Election Day

Thinking ahead to future elections, where would you most like to cast a ballot in person (assuming that all options are the same distance away)?
At a neighbor’s house
In a library or city hall
At a concert hall or sports venue
At a school
In a church
Thinking ahead to the 2024 presidential election, how likely is it that you will vote in this election?

- **Definitely will **not vote
- **Probably will **not vote
- **May or may not vote
- **Probably will **vote
- **Definitely will **vote

Do you have difficulties with any of the following activities? (choose all that apply)

- Hearing
- Seeing
- Walking
- Using your hands
- Reading
- Talking
- Thinking
- Remembering
- None
- Other: _____

[Display if None is not selected to previous question] If you vote at a polling place or vote center, would you like to be able to use an accessible voting machine to cast your ballot?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

What language do you most often speak at home?

- English
- Spanish
- Chinese
- Tagalog
- Korean
- Arabic
- Other:

[Display if English is not selected in previous question] When and if you vote at a polling place or voter center, would you like to be able to request assistance with voting in your native language?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

For future elections, would you support national legislation directing all states to send a vote by mail ballot to **any voter who requests one**?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

For future elections, would you support national legislation directing all states to send a vote by mail ballot to **every voter, even if they do not request one in advance**?

- Yes
In the 2020 Presidential Election, did you vote for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris with the Democrats or Donald Trump and Mike Pence with the Republicans?
Biden/Harris - Democrats
Trump/Pence - Republicans
Another candidate - please specify: ___
Did not vote for president

Please select “Strongly disapprove” here to confirm that you are paying attention
Strongly approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
Strongly disapprove

Were you able to access and understand information about how to vote in this election provided to you by official state and county election authorities, such as your Secretary of State, registrar, or elections director?
Yes
No

Were you able to access and understand information about how ballots are counted fairly and accurately in this election provided to you by official state and county election authorities, such as your Secretary of State, registrar, or elections director?
Yes
No

During this year’s November election, did you see any posts on social media that you feel were intended to deceive you about the election, how to vote in it, or about any of the candidates?
Yes
No

During this year’s November election, did you hear about any of your family members or friends being targeted by posts on social media that you feel were intended to deceive them about the election, how to vote in it, or about any of the candidates?
Yes
No

During this year’s November election, do you think any of your family members or friends made voting decisions or took actions that were influenced by posts on social media intended to deceive them?
Yes
No

What sources did you turn to for information about this year’s November election, how to vote in it, or about any of the candidates? (check all that apply)
A voter guide sent by state or local officials
Television
Radio
Newspapers (printed or online)
Searching the internet
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Instagram
TikTok
Another social media network

Next, we would like you to watch the short video here and answer two questions.

**Respondents in the state samples were given one of the appropriate state treatments or control**

[Colorado]

*Bipartisan Message Treatment*
[Video displayed]
What was in the background of this video?
Mountains
Beach
City
Roads

*Colorado Facts Treatment*
[Video displayed]
What city was the focus of this video?
Denver
Colorado Springs
Aurora
Durango

[Georgia]

*Absentee Voter Treatment*
[Video displayed]
What is the last image in the video?
Mountains
Lake
Desert

*Voting System Treatment*
[Video displayed]
How were the voters voting in the video?
Touchscreen
Mail-in ballot
Printed ballot

[Los Angeles]

*LA Registrar Treatment*
[Video displayed]
What county was the focus of this video?
San Francisco
San Diego
Los Angeles
San Jose

*Get Out the Vote Treatment*
[Video displayed]
What is the deadline to register to vote in Los Angeles?
October 24
December 25
August 10
June 15

[Texas]

*Texas SoS Treatment*
[Video displayed]
What state was the focus of this video?
Arkansas
Texas
New Hampshire
Oregon

*Fox News Treatment*
[Video displayed]
What state was the focus of this video?
Arkansas
Texas
New Hampshire
Oregon

[State Control]

[Video displayed]
What type of product was the focus of this commercial?
Lawnmowers
Soda
Automobiles

Next, we would like you to watch the short video here, and answer six questions when you have finished.

*[One of the next three national treatments was given for all samples]*

*Emotion treatment*
[Video displayed]

What state was the focus of this video?
Arkansas
Virginia
New Hampshire
Oregon

*Facts treatment*
[Video displayed]
What county was the focus of this video/fact sheet?
Maricopa
Pima
Graham
Greenlee

National Control
[Video displayed]
What insurance company was the focus of this commercial?
Progressive
State Farm
All State
Mercury

How much do you trust the accuracy and integrity of elections in your state?
Trust a lot
Trust some
Distrust some
Distrust a lot
Don't know/no opinion

How much do you trust the accuracy and integrity of elections in other states?
Trust a lot
Trust some
Distrust some
Distrust a lot
Don't know/no opinion

It is illegal to vote more than once in an election or to vote if not a U.S. citizen. How frequently do you think such vote fraud occurs? Please provide your best guess even if you are not sure.
Vote fraud happens all of the time
Vote fraud is very common
Vote fraud occurs about half of the time
Vote fraud occurs infrequently
Vote fraud almost never occurs

Do you think that official state or county election authorities – such as your Secretary of State, registrar, or elections director – ever engage in any form of vote fraud?
Fraud by official state or county election authorities happens all of the time
Fraud by official state or county election authorities is very common
Fraud by official state or county election authorities occurs about half of the time
Fraud by official state or county election authorities occurs infrequently
Fraud by official state or county election authorities almost never occurs

Thinking ahead to the 2024 presidential election, how likely is it that you will vote in this election?
Definitely will not vote
Probably will not vote
May or may not vote
Probably will vote
Definitely will vote